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This study analyzes the use of merchant ships and contain-
erization in an amphibious operation. Current sources, trends
and problems, as they affect the merchant marine's ability
to provide military logistical support to amphibious opera-
tions are evaluated. The functional capability of the vari-
ous types of merchant ships to perform in an amphibious
environment are analyzed. Modern concepts for solving the
vehicle and container discharge problem from merchant ships
are described and evaluated. The current Marine Corps Con-
tainer System is analyzed for its compatibility with shipping
assets and container handling/motor transport equipment. The
study concluded that there are many problems when considering
the use of merchant ships and containerization in an amphibi-
ous operation. These include the shortage of adequate shipping
and the inability to efficiently handle containers in an
amphibious environment. Among the several recommendations
presented are: first, that military planners must establish
the number and type of merchant ships required for large
scale amphibious operations and work to ensure their availa-
bility and second, that the development and purchase of con-
tainers and container offloading equipment for use in an
amphibious objective area be expedited.
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1. Amphibious Force - A naval force and landing force,
together with supporting forces that are trained, organized,
and equipped for amphibious operations.
2. Amphibious Objective Area - A defined geographical area
within which is located an objective to be captured or
reached by the land force. This area is defined by compe-
tent authority for purposes of command and control . In
amphibious operations, the objective area is delineated




Amphibious Operation - An attack launched from the sea
by naval and landing forces, embarked in ships or crafts
involving a landing on a hostile shore.
4 Amphibious Shipping - Organic Navy ships specifically
designed to transport, land, and support landing forces
in amphibious assault operations and capable of being
loaded or unloaded by naval personnel without external
assistance in the amphibious objective area.
5. Amphibious Task Force - The task organization formed
for the purpose of conducting an amphibious operation.
The amphibious task force always includes Navy forces and




6. Amphibious Task Force Commander - The Navy officer
designated in the initiating directive as commander of
an amphibious task force.
7. D-day - The day of the initial landing (D+5 would be
five days after the initial landing)
.
8. Floating Dumps - Emergency supplies preloaded in land-
ing craft, barges, amphibian vehicles or landing ships.
Floating dumps are located in the vicinity of the appro-
priate control officer who directs their landing as re-
quested by the troop commander concerned.
9. Intermodal Ships - These are containerships, barge
ships and roll on/roll off ships. They vary in size,
types of cargo handled and cargo capacity.
10
.
Lighter - A landing craft or barge employed in an
amphibious operation, and used for carrying troops,
equipment and/or cargo from ship-to-shore.
11. Logistic Support Areas - Those areas ashore which
contain the necessary supplies, equipment, installations,
and elements which are required to support the landing
force logistically throughout the operation.
12. Mothballed - Refers to ships docked and not utilized
primarily for cost conservation. However, they are main-
tained and preserved in order that they may be reactivated
within a prescribed time frame when needed.
13. Pendulation - The swinging back and forth of containers
suspended from helicopters, lighter-than-air vehicles and/




14. Seastate 1 - Sea condition with waves up to one foot
high.
15. Seastate 2 - Sea condition with waves from one to
three feet high.
16. Seastate 3 - Sea condition with waves from three to
five feet high.
17. Seastate 4 - Sea condition with waves from five to
eight feet high.
18. Stevedore - A person employed in the loading or
unloading of ships.
19. Tare Weight - The weight of a container that is
deducted from the gross weight to obtain net weight.
20. Tramp Fleet - That segment of the merchant fleet
which does not adhere to a schedule of sailings, but





A. BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE ON THE NEED FOR MERCHANT
MARINE SHIPPING IN AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION
i
1. United States Marine Corps (USMC) Mission and
Organization
The USMC is responsible for developing warfare
doctrine, tactics, techniques, and equipment for use in
amphibious operations. Key provisions of the National
Security Act of 1947 state that:
The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,
shall be so organized as to include not less than
three combat divisions and three air wings, and
such other land combat, aviation, and other ser-
vices as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps
shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide
fleet marine forces of combined arms together with
supporting air components for service with the
fleet in the seizure and defense of advanced naval
bases and for the conduct of such land operations
as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval
campaign. 2
The USMC's peacetime structure consists of three
active and one reserve Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) . Each
MAF consists of an infantry division, a force service support
group and an aircraft wing. The force service support group's
primary responsibility is to provide logistical support to
the division and wing.
An amphibious assault involves projecting force from
the sea, powerful enough to take and control the beach and
displace shore defenders. Once this is accomplished, a
beachhead is developed and offensive action is mounted inland
toward an ultimate objective.
18

In order to conduct an amphibious assault, the MAF
serves as a reservoir of resources for use in establishing
a Marine air/ground task force. A task force can be any
size; however, it would typically fall into one of the
three structures outlined in Table 1-1.
The USMC's active forces are deployed as follows:
a. a MAF is based on the East Coast for use in contin- v
gencies in the Atlantic hemisphere.
b. a second MAF is deployed in the Western Pacific
(Japan and Okinawa) to support U.S. policy in the Pacific
hemisphere and Indian Ocean.
c. a third is based on the West Coast and functions as
a "swing force" for deployment anywhere, in the Pacific
or Atlantic.
^
2 . Need for Amphibious Force Today
In a recent article in the Marine Corps Gazette
,
Lieutenant Commander (LCdr) Carl Doublas, United States
Navy (USN) stated that the office of the Chief of Naval
Operations has acknowledged the U.S. naval amphibious mission
is the lowest priority, but the highest in probability of
5
occurrence.
An examination of recent world news events reveals
the reasons for LCdr Douglas' statement. The Soviet Union
is acting with a decreasing regard for the interests, con-
cerns and sensitivities of the American people. Consider
the following events that took place in 19 79.
19

...the USSR supports 45,000 proxy Cuban troops in
Africa, principally in Angola and Ethiopia; it seeks
to inflame fanatical anti-American mobs in Iran;
KGB officers were, in effect, accomplices in the
murder of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan earlier
this year; top Kremlin leaders threaten America's
NATO partners for even considering stationing Pershing
II and ground-launched cruise missiles on their terri-
tories as a counter to the new Soviet SS-20 mobile
missiles and Backfire bombers targeted against them;
and the same Kremlin leaders have had the temerity
to warn the U.S. Senate against rejecting SALT II,
a treaty which opponents say would codify U.S. mili-
tary superiority . . . *>
To add to the list, Soviet tanks and troops moved across its
border into neighboring Afghanistan. The Soviets have
reached an estimated strength of 8 0,000 military personnel
there
.
Adding to the increasing importance of the Indian
Ocean and Persian Gulf on the list of America's strategic
concerns is the taking of U.S. citizens as hostages at the
U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. This situation does not appear
to have any immediate resolution and has potential for mili-
tary intervention.
In 19 79, there were also national security problems
closer to the borders of the U.S. In Cuba, there was the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) confirmation of a Russian •"
Combat Brigade of 2000 to 3000 men, equipped with tanks and
artillery. The Soviets have stated that the troops had been
there as a training unit since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
and that they had no intention of leaving.
Concurrently, the Sandinistas, supported by Cuban
and Panamanian arms and materiel, were exerting control over
20

Nicaragua. They forced pro-U.S. dictator, Anastasio Somoza,
to flee.
In October of 1979, due to the Panama Canal treaty,
the U.S. turned over several military bases and facilities
to Panama, significantly decreasing American military
presence in Central America.
Aside from pro-Cuban governments in Panama and
Nicaragua, Fidel Castro, Cuba's leader, is determined to
spread his influence over island states in the West Indies.
He has also demanded Puerto Rico ' s independence from the
U.S.
On the other side of the world, there have been some
very notable events taking place. A 1979 United States
Army (USA) intelligence report stated that North Korea has
a significantly higher number of troops than was previously
believed. There was also news of the assasination of Presi-
dent Park Chung Hee , the President of Korea.
In 1979, Soviet warships docked at Cam Ranh Bay and
Da Nang in a reaction to the Republic of China ' s campaign
across the Vietnam border. Both these ports were major U.S.
installations during the Vietnam War and were built at con-
siderable expense to the U.S. government. In the early 1980 's,
Vietnamese troops have moved across the borders of Cambodia
into Thailand, in pursuit of Cambodian guerrillas. This
has caused the U.S. to react with increased shipments of
military supplies to the Thai government.
21

Many of the actions that President Carter has taken
to counter moves against U.S. interests in 19 79 and the early
19 80's involved U.S. Naval Forces. He sent the USS Con-
stellation (CV 64) with 85 airplanes to the Arabian Sea/
Persian Gulf when pro-Soviet South Yemen attacked North Yemen,
He ordered the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) and her battlegroup to
the Arabian Sea to joing the other carrier USS Midway (CV
41) ahd five other USN ships. Aboard these naval ships was
a reinforced Marine battalion landing team (BLT) with tanks
and artillery, capable of mounting an amphibious assault.
President Carter also called on the USMC and the USN
in the Caribbean. Approximately 2000 Marines were loaded
aboard ships in Morehead City, North Carolina, and sent on
an amphibious exercise to the U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The exercise received extensive coverage by the
news media, and the USMC carried out the amphibious landing
without a flaw. Both the Russian and Cuban governments
7
monitored the exercise with great interest.
President Carter, frustrated by Russia's refusal to
change the status quo in Cuba, talked of speeding up the
organization of a rapid deployment force. He also wanted
U.S. airlift and sealift capabilities improved. It is pro-
jected that Diego Garcia, a 15-mile long tropical island in
the middle of the Indian Ocean, will play an important part
in the newly created Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) . Pentagon
officials have indicated that at least one 16,500-man Marine
o
brigade of the three will be assigned to the Indian Ocean.
22

Seven pre-positioned cargo ships having 30-days worth
9
of USMC equipment aboard would be deployed there. The cargo
ships are part of the maritime prepositioning concept (MPS)
.
The MPS, a major development in 1980, calls for each Marine
brigade to be supported by multi-purpose cargo ships, prepo-
sitioned in potential trouble spots. General R.H. Barrow,
Commandant of the Marine Corps, cautioned that although mari-
time prepositioning has many advantages, it does not eliminate
the continuing need for an amphibious assault capability.
General Barrow states:
One cannot assume that you will have a benign environ-
ment where the marriage of the personnel and the equip-
ment takes place. If you can in some sort of admin-
istrative fashion, position yourself where you are
needed, how wonderful! But in the absence of any ,
n
assurance, one must be prepared for a forcible entry.
The events of 197 9 and thus far in 1980 indicate
that there are indeed many possible arenas for future con-
frontation. This places an additional premium on strategic
mobility of U.S. Naval Forces. Political and economic oppo-
sition to costly overseas basing and international problems
in renewing defense agreements are likely to continue.
3. Role of Airlift
Speaking before the 1977 Worldwide Strategic Mobility
Conference, Lieutenant General Maurice Casey, USA, Director
of Logistics for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) states:
the role and influence of the U.S. must be based
on a powerful central reserve and the strategic
mobility that modern technology permits us.
Central reserve without mobility and the ability
to fight on arrival in overseas areas present
23

no capability, are ineffective, and are not worth
their cost.-^
With the advent of the jumbo jet and related tech-
nology, airlift has become a viable partner to strategic
sealift. Military planners are cognizant of the impact and
are committed to the development of the U.S.' airlift capa-
bility. Their approach to date has been creative, comprehen-
sive and ambitious. By reducing the equipment which accom-
panies advanced assault units, prepositioning materiel, and
exploiting host country support in certain contingencies,
initial lift needs have been substantially reduced. "Sub-
stantially" however, does not equate to "significant" in terms
of total figures. Even the most optimistic estimates limit
the expanding airlift capacity to no more than ten percent
12
of the lift requirements in the near future. The large
size of a MAF makes it infeasible to transport by air.
If the world situation required the projection of a
MAF onto foreign soil, sealift would still be the primary
mode of transportation.
4. Status of Amphibious Shipping
In order to be able to conduct amphibious warfare,
the USMC is heavily dependent on the USN's shipbuilding
budget. In his annual posture statement on Capital Hill
early in 1979, General Louis H. Wilson, the Commandant of
the Marine Corps at the time, painted a very gloomy picture
of the current situation for amphibious shipping: "the
current five year defense plan shows an already reduced
24

amphibious lift capability that further declines through




General Wilson pointed out that with the events of
1979, the need to strengthen the USN/USMC amphibious team
is even more crucial now than when he sounded the alarm a
year earlier. Even if a start were made in next year's fis-
cal year (FY) 1981 budget, three ships a year would have to
be built to maintain a lift capability of 1.15 MAF ' s . General
Wison stated:
Our amphibious lift capability has shrunk dramati-
cally during the past 15 years or so. The amphi-
bious ship force level, for example, has decreased
from 133 ships in 1962 to a total of 66 ships today.
Unless these aging ships are replaced, that number
would dwindle to only six by the year 2002.15
Between 1990 and 2002, 53 more amphibious ships are due to
retire. "I would assess the impact at that time..." Wilson
said at another point in his testimony, "...as unacceptable
in regard to national security."
Table 1-2 shows the amphibious ship breakdown by type
as of September 19 80. The probable retirement dates of these
ships is also included. Also to be considered when addressing
the availability of USN amphibious ships are (a) deployment
results in roughly a 50-50 split between Pacific and Atlantic
ports and (b) about 30 percent of these ships are in mainte-
17
nance and, therefore, not immediately operational. The
USN assumes that ships undergoing overhaul could be available
for use in 30 days after mobilization. Ships in the Pacific
25

Ocean would require 26 days to reach the Atlantic ports
18
under optimal conditions.
The procurement picture for amphibious shipping in
the future is also dismal. Initial procurement of the dock
landing ship (LSD) -41 class has been postponed for seven
years
.
In 1974 the Navy formalized the requirement to
i
replace its inventory of eight LSD-28 class ships
which would reach the end of their 30-year service
life between 1948-87. The original plan called for
a one-for-one replacement of each LSD to be
called the LSD-41. Procurement of the lead LSD-
41 was scheduled for FY78 with one ship each in
FY's 79 and 80, two in FY81 and the remaining three
in FY8 3. But before the plan could be implemented,
fiscal limitations, coupled with a general deempha-
sis on the need to build amphibious ships caused
the program to be continually altered and delayed
each year that it was proposed. The FY80 budget
submitted to the President and subsequently to the
Congress was no exception, it contained no LSD-41. 19
The five-year shipbuilding plan for FY's 80-84 sub-
mitted by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to Congress did
not include any LSD-41 's or for that matter any other amphi-
bious ships.
The difficulty is partly one of cost. The high price
of ships has caused the Carter administration to postpone
building programs. Current plans are to build up and modern-
ize U.S. air and ground units assigned to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) central front in Europe. Funding
for the buildup has caused corresponding reduction in the
USN and USMC forces around the world. Among the hardest hit




As presented in the previous section, the world situation
today requires that the U.S. have the capability to lift a
large MAF for the conduct of an amphibious operation on
foreign soil. The United States Air Force (USAF) , although
continually improving, does not have the capacity to lift
a force the size of a MAF.
Neither the previous administration nor the present one
has put amphibious shipping very high on the priority list.
Therefore, the future of the already reduced amphibious lift
capability of the USN is not very promising for the USMC.
With a continued increase of world tension and restricted
resources, what alternative means do the USN/USMC have to
solve the problem of reduced lift capability? This is the




The capability of the USN/USMC to utilize merchant ships
in an amphibious operation to supplement the USN's reduced
amphibious lift capability will be examined.
Since containerships compose an ever growing percentage
of today's merchant fleet, a secondary objective will be to
examine the use of containerization as a radical change from





D. GENERAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
The research for this thesis was accomplished by the
following methods:
1. literature search.
2. data collection (actual studies being accomplished
by the Marine Corps Development Command, Quantico, Virginia,
and the Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, Cali-
fornia) .
3. interviews with personnel currently involved with
ongoing studies relative to the use of merchant ships and
containers by the USN/USMC.
4. on site examination of the testing being conducted
at the Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme, Cali-
fornia.
The composition and characteristics of the past, present
and future merchant fleets are presented. There is specific
emphasis on the offshore discharge of cargo problem charac-
teristic of a USN/USMC amphibious operation.
Finally, there is a detailed analysis of the impacts,
requirements and progress of containerization as a means of
packaging cargo to be utilized by the USMC in an amphibious
operation.
E. THESIS CHAPTER SUMMARY
The first chapter introduces the reader to the mission
and organization of the USMC, the need for an amphibious
force in today's environment, the problem of reduced
28

amphibious lift capability of the USN, and the author's
objectives and research methodology.
Chapter II discusses the development, trends and prob-
lems of the U.S. merchant fleet.
Chapter III analyzes the functional characteristics of
merchant ships and their suitability to perform specialized
tasks in support of a USN/USMC amphibious operation.
Chapter IV examines the offshore discharge problem
that evolves from the use of merchant ships in an amphibi-
ous operation and the progress of current developments to
solve the problem.
Chapter V analyzes the impact and requirements of con-
tainerization as it relates to use by the USMC in an amphi-
bious operation. The types of containers being developed
and the tactical consideration of their use will be presented
Also current trends and project status in containerization
will be discussed.
Finally, in Chapter VI the author summarizes his findings
and makes recommendations for future consideration.
Although an attempt has been made to avoid technical
terminology whenever possible, there are words utilized in
this thesis that may be unfamiliar to some readers. For
this reason, a glossary of terms is provided.
29


































plement 1,600-4,000 6,000-18,000 40,000-50,000
Tactical
aircraft As required 45-65 125-175
Helicopters 20-36 75-100 175-225
Tanks 5-10 17-34 70-140
Artillery
pieces 6-12 24-42 75-100
— A MAF may have more than one Marine Division and more than one
Marine Aircraft Wing.
Table 1-1
Source: Marine Amphibious Forces
Role, and Mission, pT 3~T
A Look at Their Readiness,
30

1980 Amphibious Ship Force
Ship Class Name
Nunber of Probable Retirement Date
Active 1984- 1991- 1999- 2007-
Ships 87 97 2003 10









LSD-36 Dock Landing Ship










Total 63 12 38
Table 1-2




II. UNITED STATES MARITIME INDUSTRY, DEVELOPMENT
TRENDS AND PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter I of this study pointed out the significant
decline of United States Navy (USN) amphibious shipping
over the past 15 years. In large scale amphibious opera-
tions of the future, the USN and USMC will be dependent upon
the U.S. Merchant Marine as a vital component of the amphibi-
out task force (ATF) . The term U.S. Merchant Marine refers
to commercial ships, under private ownership, sailing under
the U.S. flag. In order to provide some background informa-
tion on the U.S. Merchant Marine, this chapter will present:
1. the development of the U.S. Merchant Marine with
regard to defense needs.
2. the U.S. government maritime support programs that
have been established to ensure the U.S. Merchant Marine
as a viable naval auxiliary in time of war.
3. organizations formed to provide a source of merchant
ships needed to support a military contingency.
4. the trends and problems of the U.S. Merchant Marine
as they exist today.
B. SEALIFT DEVELOPMENT
The importance of sealift in the security of the U.S.
was recognized very early by national leaders. In 1778, the
First Congress of the U.S. passed legislation to protect and
32

develop the U.S. Merchant Marine. The U.S. has had to
rely heavily on merchant marine sealift capability in every
war from World War I to Vietnam.
At the beginning of World War I, the American merchant
fleet was virtually non-existent. As a result the govern-
ment was faced with a massive ship building effort. The
Emergency Fleet Corporation and the War Shipping Board were
established in 1916. These agencies were tasked with accel-
erating the buildup of both the United States Army (USA)
and USN fleets, resulting in contracts for 3,200 ships in
2the period between 1916 and 1919.
Prior to World War II, the nation was faced with a simi-
lar situation. The large force built as a result of World
War I had been neglected and was close to obsolescence. As
a result, Congress enacted the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
The policy of the U.S. government concerning the merchant
marine is stated in the opening section of this Act:
It is necessary for the national defense and develop-
ment of its foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant marine Ca) suffix
cient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce
and a substantial portion of the water-borne export
and import foreign commerce of the United States
and to provide shipping service on all routes essen-
tial for maintaining the flow of such domestic and
foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable
of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in
time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and
operated under the United States flag by citizens
of the United States insofar as may be practicable,
and (d) composed of the best-equipped, safest, and
most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the
United States and manned with a trained and efficient
citizen personnel. It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States to foster the develop-




The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 established the Maritime
Commission which was chartered to develop a national program
promoting the merchant marine. The commission developed a
ten-year program to build 500 new merchant ships. This pro-
4gram was starting when World War II began.
The U.S. entered World War II with both the USA and USN
retaining their individual ocean shipping capability. Through-
out the war, the two services remained separate despite an
effort in 1942 to combine the USA and USN transport fleets.
The USN proposed taking over the USA's fleet. The proposal
was rejected when the USN was unable to provide trained
crews to man USA ships
.
On 5 January 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). studied
the feasibility of making the USN solely responsible for
sea transportation. As a result of this study, the Military
Sea Transportation Services (MSTS) was established on 2
August 1949 and the assets of both the USA and USN were
combined.
In the civil sector, reorganization efforts associated
with the birth of MSTS were in progress. The Maritime Com-
mission was abolished and replaced by two agencies: the
Federal Maritime Board which was responsible for the regula-
tion and administration of the subsidy programs; and the
Maritime Administration (MARAD) which was charged with the





At the outbreak of the Korean War, the primary civil
maritime agencies were only three months old and ill-
prepared to initiate effective actions. Defense transpor-
p
tation capabilities were, once again, inadequate. MSTS was
the only organization that had the capability and authority
to meet the emergency shipping needs of the Korean War.
Augmenting a nucleus fleet of 174 ships, MSTS acquired
over 400 chartered and government-owned reserve
ships and with excellent support from private ship
operators, began the movement of war supplies and
personnel to the combat zone. The initial effort
on the part of the newly chartered MSTS clearly
demonstrated its capability for innovative action
and dedicated service.
9
Despite MSTS' notable performance, the nation as a whole was
not prepared to supply the necessary sealift required to
transport logistical supplies to Korea.
Reaction to the lack of sealift preparedness was convinc-
ing. The National Shipbuilding Authority (NSA) rapidly assumed
its function as a wartime shipping contract agency. NSA was
a subordinate shipbuilding agency of MARAD and was estab-
lished by the Defense Production Act of 1950.
MSTS maintained a flow of military supplies to the
Far East of over 30,000 tons per day. This task
was accomplished by a MSTS-controlled fleet that
by 1 April 1953, had grown to 531 vessels, 111 of
which had been obtained through NSA general agency
contracts. The American flag cargo fleet, which
in June 1950 consisted of 633 ships, had by
December 1951 swelled to 1,193 vessels, contributing
a capability of over 1,000,000 tons per month.
H
At the height of the Korean War, MSTS controlled 602 ships
and crafts, 335 of them were chartered commercial vessels.
In all, MSTS lifted more than 54 million measurement tons
35

(40 cubic feet to a ton) of cargo, five million troops and
passengers, and 22 million long tons of petroleum products
12
to, from, and within the Far East.
In the mid-1960 's when then President Lyndon B. Johnson
made the decision to intervene in Vietnam, 100 ships of the
merchant marine were standing idle on the East Coast and
Gulf of Mexico ports due to labor strikes. The maritime
union agreed to man ships with the limitation that they
would only carry military cargo. As a consequence, the
merchant marine responded reasonably well at the outset
of the Vietnam conflict. However, it became immediately
apparent that the merchant marine was not going to be able
to keep up with the escalating demands of the military in
*
Vietnam. One hundred seventy-two mothballed ships were
activated from the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF)
.
This brought the total MSTS-controlled ship inventory to
501 ships. This was sufficient to satisfy the Vietnam
requirement.
Between 1965 and 19 72, MSTS-controlled tankers delivered
more than 16 million long tons (128 million barrels) of
petroleum products to Southeast Asia. Government-owned
commercial ships under contract with MSTS delivered more
14than 85 million measurement tons of dry cargo to that area.
During MSTS' involvement in Vietnam, 96 percent of the
• • 15
military cargo was moved by sea. This demonstrates the
*
See glossary of terms.
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importance of the merchant marine in support of a military
contingency action.
It can be concluded from this section that at the start
of each war, the merchant marine was not fully prepared to
meet defense transportation needs. Commencing with World
War I, there has been a requirement for a rapid buildup of
ships to meet military logistical requirements.
C. GOVERNMENT MARITIME SUPPORT PROGRAMS
The previous discussion on the development of the U.S.
maritime industry shows that the U.S. has had to rely heavily
on the merchant marine in time of war. In order to improve
the merchant fleet's capability to respond in time of national
emergency, there have been several maritime support programs
initiated by the U.S. government.
1. Shipping Act of 1916
This Act was passed when the U.S. found itself with
inadequate shipping assets to meet its military and com-
mercial requirements in World War I. It also established a
panel named the Shipping Board for the purpose of creating
a naval auxiliary, a naval reserve and a merchant marine to
meet the war-time requirements of the U.S. Two thousand,
three hundred ships were built to meet the requirements of
World War I; however, the majority of them were not delivered
16
until after the Armistice.
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2. Merchant Marine Act of 1920
This Act, in a clear statement of purpose, related
the merchant marine to national defense. It states:
It is necessary for the national defense and for the
proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce
that the United States have a merchant marine of
the best-equipped and most suitable types of vessels
sufficient to carry the greater part of its commerce
and serve as a naval and military auxiliary in time
of war and/or national emergency, ultimately to
be owned and operated privately by citizens of the
United States. 17
Toward the end of the decade, U.S. flag shipping was
experiencing difficulty in foreign trade. The ships built
out of necessity of World War I were nearing obsolescence.
Further, the U.S. merchant fleet was experiencing greater
18
operating costs than its competing foreign carriers.
3. Merchant Marine Act of 192 8
In an effort to provide relief to the U.S. flag
merchant fleet, the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 was estab-
lished. This Act authorized the Postmaster General to con-
tract with the merchant marine for the transportation of
mail. This in effect was a subsidy program designed to
appease congressional critics. It also provided a 250 million
dollar construction loan fund. This fund was used to build
1931 new ships and recondition 41 others.
4
.
Merchant Marine Act of 19 36
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936, already discussed
in the section on sealift development, enhanced the national
policy regarding the role of the merchant marine as a naval
auxiliary. It created the U.S. Maritime Commission which
38

had the task of promoting and developing U.S. maritime shipping
The Merchant Marine Act of 19 36 provided the U.S. Maritime
Commission with a variety of means in order to carry out
its mission. These included:
a. construction—differential subsidies
b. operating—differential subsidies
c. loan granting powers
d. purchase credit allowance
e. powers to restrict sales and use of vessels acquired
by the Commission
f. payment for required national defense features on
subsidized ships
g. low interest construction loans
h. income tax benefits for shipowners
i. construction of vessels for private charter
j . subsidies to offset payment to foreign competitors
k. guarantee of ship mortgages
1. training of merchant seamen
m. authority to prescribe wage and other benefits to
merchant seamen
n. authority to requisition or purchase ships required for
20
national defense needs.
The 1936 Act forms the basis for governmental support of
the U.S. Merchant Marine.
5. Merchant Marine Sales Act of 19 4 6
During the period of 1936 to 1945, the U.S. Maritime
Commission built more than 6,000 merchant ships. As a
39

result the U.S. government, not private enterprise, owned
the largest merchant fleet in the world. The Merchant Ship
Sales Act of 1946 was passed in an effort to transfer owner-
ship from the government to private citizens. It gave prefer-
ence to U.S. citizens in purchasing ships from the govern-
ment. It also provided for the NDRF. One thousand, four
hundred, twenty-one ships were put in mothballs for military
contingency. This number has steadily declined. In 19 77,
21
there were only 143 vessels in the NDRF.
6. "Fifty-Fifty Law" of 1954
In 1954, Congress passed legislation which channeled
one half of the government financed cargo into U.S. ships.
The purpose of this law was to compensate owners for the high
cost of American flag ships and to prevent them from scrap-
22ping their ships and going into other fields of enterprise.
However, non-subsidized carriers who had purchased ships at
bargain prices from the war surplus fleet remained in business
only until these ships had to be scrapped. Then these
carriers went into other fields of enterprise. They did not
build any new dry-cargo ships. The proof of the failure of
the "Fifty-Fifty Law" of 1954 was presented in 1976 and 1977.
Forty percent of the wheat sold to Russia was to be transported
by the U.S. dry cargo fleet; however, there were not enough
23
ships under U.S. registry to lift the full American share.
7. The Merchant Marine Act of 19 70
The 1936 Act did not completely encourage the devel-
opment of a balanced cargo fleet. The purpose of the Act of
40

1970 was to correct this deficiency by expanding, modernizing
and increasing the efficiency of the merchant fleet.
The Act of 1970 authorized the establishment of a
Commission on American Shipbuilding to track the
progress of the American shipbuilding program. It
relaxed restriction on operating subsidy eligibility
and reset the upper limits on maximum construction
subsidies. The Act deferred taxes on earnings
gained from foreign and domestic trade if the funds
were used to establish a capital fund for new ship
construction and rehabilitation. The Act tasked the
Secretary of Commerce to determine the type of
vessels to be built with construction subsidies.
The Secretary, through the Maritime Administration,
initiated a series of programs to produce ships for
all segments of the merchant fleet. 24
Due to the 1970 Act, the U.S. merchant fleet has
added 6 6 new ships and 2 7 reconstructed vessels up through
1979. The percentage of U.S. liner cargo is at the highest
25point in the past 20 years.
8 . Summary
It can be concluded from the seven maritime support
programs enacted since 1916, that the U.S. government has
recognized that the nation's economic well-being and national
security are closely related to U.S. strength at sea. The
programs presented are designed to aid the development and
operation of the U.S. Merchant Marine.
D. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND (MSC)
In August 1970, MSTS was renamed MSC. Rear Admiral John
D. Chase, USN, a past commander of MSC, stated that MSC was
a military organization and not only a commercial shipping
line. He emphasized MSC's role in contingency planning and
41

the development and utilization of new sealift concepts,
techniques and systems to include the movement of the USMC
2 6
and their supplies and equipment.
The MSC is organized worldwide and is suited to take
advantage of containerization and other intermodal aspects.
The organization of MSC is shown in figure II-l.
MSC maintains a fleet that consists of two groups of
ships: a commercial chartered fleet and a government-owned
nucleus fleet. Figure II-2 shows the assets of these two
groups as of 3 February 19 78.
The size of the controlled fleet is constantly fluctuating.
There is a degree of flexibility which is gained by with-
drawing ships from the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and placing
them in full operating status (FOS) . Also, commercial char-
ters can be added or deleted, contributing to the fluctuating
27
assets of MSC.
As of the beginning of 19 78, approximately one third of
MSC's total amount of controlled ships were chartered from
commercial sources. Not all of MSC's assets are used for
transportation of military supplies. Approximately one half
of MSC's nucleus fleet is used for non-transportation purposes,
28
such as support of research and cable repair.
MSC's primary mission is to provide contingency sealift
capability for the Department of Defense (DOD) . Other
See glossary of terms.
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responsibilities include worldwide direction of DOD cargoes
by sea in peacetime and the operation of DOD vessels used
primarily for the non-transportation purposes already dis-
29
cussed. MSC is also tasked with manning some underway
replenishment ships in direct support of the USN fleet. The
crew of these ships is comprised primarily of civilian
personnel
.
As of November 19 79/ the 2 4-ship Naval Fleet Auxiliary
Force consisted of 11 oilers, a stores ship, six ocean-going
tugs, three fleet ballistic missile resupply ships and three
cable ships. Five additional oilers are under construction.
In January of 1980, a 12th oiler, the USS Truckee (AO-147)
,
was turned over to the MSC for civilian manning. MSC is
operating more than 50 percent of the USN oilers.
In order to accomplish its peacetime mission of deliver-
ing dry cargo and fuel for the military service, MSC is
supported by a 5,70 0-man work force and a total of more than
105 ships. Ninety-five percent of all the dry cargo that
31MSC moves is done so in privately-owned ships.
MSC negotiates rates with private carriers for container
and breakbulk service. Currently 77 percent of defense ocean
dry cargo is shipped by containers . The rest of the cargo
32is either too large or not suited for containers.
The MSC is largely dependent on the U.S. Merchant Marine
for movement of military sealift cargo, both in peacetime
and in war. Therefore, a viable MSC-controlled fleet is
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needed for immediate reaction in military contingency opera-
tions. Currently, however, MSC consists largely of aging




It can be concluded that this shortcoming prevents MSC
from satisfying its critical sealift responsibilities. MSC's
ability to rapidly react to a military contingency with the
right type of ships is in serious doubt.
E. NDRF
The NDRF is a mothball fleet that comes under the respon-
sibility of MARAD. The NDRF contains approximately 150
"military useful" ships and many of them are left over from
35World War II. Ships in the NDRF are to be maintained in such
3 fi
a manner that they can be activated within 30 days of callup.
There are numerous problem areas relating to the response
capability of ships in the NDRF. The most serious of these
is their material condition. The ships of the NDRF are not
maintained in a condition conducive to either rapid or economi-
cal reactivation. Lack of proper equipment, facilities, and
personnel; lack of adequate funding; and lack of an adequate
preservation program are all contributing factors to the poor
37
material condition of the reserve fleet. It is estimated
that an average of 40,000 man-hours per ship will be required
38to fully service a reserve ship and make it ready for sea.
39Within the NDRF there are 14 ships known as the RRF.
This is an increase of six ships from 1978. Funding to
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upgrade the ships in the NDRF is planned through fiscal
40 ...
year (FY 19 82) . These ships are maintained in a state
of readiness that would allow them to be put into operation
41
in approximately five to ten days.
In early 1976, MARAD conducted an analysis of the time
to activate ships from the RRF. The result of MARAD's
examination determined that these ships could not be activated
within five to ten days. MARAD found that it would take 30
to 40 days to activate them. Since 19 76, the ability of the
RRF to respond to an emergency callup has not been adequately
42tested.
It can be concluded that the ability of the NDRF and RRF
to provide reserve shipping within prescribed time frames
is inadequate. DOD would have to rely on MSC and privately-
owned merchant ships at the onset of a military contingency.
F. EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES CONTROL FLEET (EUSC)
In order to take advantage of liberal corporate laws
and tax advantages, many corporations operate a number of
43
ships under Liber lan, Panamanian or Honduran registry.
44This commenced in the 1920's and was the beginning of EUSC.
45As of February 1977, the EUSC consisted of over 400 vessels.
The use of the fleet for defense purposes and the
use of the term "effective U.S. control fleet" came
about as a result of a program of Panamanian registry
that was an attempt to circumvent the provisions
of the Neutrality Act of 19 39 and allow the United




DOD accepted EUSC as a viable part of the U.S. defense
contingency planning based on the following rationale:
1. contracts in effect between MARAD and affected ship-
owners include callup procedures.
2. the laws of Honduras, Panama and Liberia contain no
restrictions.
3. the precedent of World War II when Honduran and Pana-
manean registered vessels were fully assimilated in the
U.S. war effort.
4. EUSC shipowners purchased war risk insurance which
47indicated their intent to serve when called.
A close look at EUSC for use in a military contingency
raises serious doubts about its usefulness. Over 300 of the
estimated 400 ships in EUSC are tankers that are unsuitable
for dry cargo carrying and many of them require deep water
ports. Eight-five of the approximately 100 dry cargo car-
riers are breakbulk ships not suitable for containers. Of
the few new modern commercial ships that are in EUSC, most
of them are not self-sustaining, i.e., they require sophis-
ticated cargo-handling, support facilities ashore which,
48during wartime would, in all likelihood, not be available.
Probably the most serious question concerning EUSC
would be its responsiveness to national security require-
ments. Experience during the Vietnam War supports the conten-
tion that reliance on EUSC could be a mistake. There were
two incidents in the Vietnam War that are worthy of note.
46

They involved the refusal of foreign crews to sail into a
49
combat zone.
It can be concluded that EUSC cannot be counted upon
as a source of dry cargo vessels in time of emergency. The
number of vessels of the right type is severely limited.
Further, there is always doubt about the reliability of
foreign crews to support a U.S. combat effort.
G. POTENTIAL FOR FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN U.S. MARITIME INDUSTRY
Today there exists a trend toward foreign ownership in
the U.S. shipbuilding industry. There has been increasing
investment by foreign industrial firms in U.S. plants and
companies . This has come about because of the weakening
dollar and the high interest rates in the U.S. Ernest G.
Frankel, in his article, "The Potential for Foreign Ownership
in the U.S. Maritime Industry," states that the impact of
foreign ownership will be felt by the U.S. maritime industry
in the years to come. He predicts that there will be no
significant difference in the costs of U.S. shipbuilding
labor and the material costs experienced by other industri-
alized countries. The declining dollar and the excess of
foreign investment capital could lead to the purchase of major
U.S. shipyards or the construction of U.S. ships by foreign
interests. Further, foreign owners would not have the
same restrictions now placed on U.S. flag operations. For
example, U.S. flag operators have to employ U.S. nationals,
a restriction that would not be faced by foreign owners. The
47

fact that the U.S. continues to dominate world trade offers
52future incentives for investment in U.S. flag shipping.
Several Japanese and German companies have shown inter-
est in investing in the U.S. shipbuilding industry. One
more incentive besides current economic conditions is the
potential for increased productivity by foreign shipowners.
Potential foreign owners with more extensive experience in
the use of technological change in shipbuilding are of the
opinion that a great opportunity for major productivity
improvements exist in U.S. shipbuilding. Further, they have
the opportunity to add the U.S. to their list of traditional
markets
.
Foreign investment and ownership in the U.S. maritime
industry offers some advantages for the U.S. These include
influx of needed capital, infusion of new management tech-
niques, more extensive trading and marketing routes and in-
54
creasing the scale of operation.
Foreign ownership in the U.S. maritime industry raises
some serious questions about its potential as a military
auxiliary.
U.S. maritime policy has been based on the tradi-
tional premise of defense and economic essentiality
for more than 50 years. The assumption inherent
in the policy has also been that the U.S. maritime
industry should be largely U.S. citizen-owned and
manned to assure its reliability under conditions
of national emergency. 55
Can foreign-owned/managed shipyards and vessels be counted
on by the U.S. government in time of emergency? As experi-
enced in the Vietnam sealift, it could prove to be a problem.
48

H. CURRENT TREND OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
There has been a technological revolution that has swept
through the world's maritime transportation industry since
1956. The technique of the shipping business has been radi-
cally changed. The breakbulk carrier is a ship that carries
a cargo of thousands of individual boxes, bags, bales and
barrels. It took days of arduous labor by large numbers of
men to unload and load a breakbulk ship in the 1950 's. In
1956, this concept changed. Malcom P. McLean, a former
truck-line executive, proved that it was feasible to stow
cargo aboard a ship in containers. Further, this same con-
tainer could be used to transport items on trucks and rail-
road cars. Because of this revolutionary idea, the ship's
unloading time was reduced from a matter of days to a matter
of hours. Automation, in the form of innovative material
handling equipment, took the place of hundreds of longshore-
men who manhandled the thousands of packages stowed on the
breakbulk carriers.
Speed became the essential feature of modern merchant
ship operations. The older breakbulk ships, which travelled
at a slow 14 to 17 knots, were far surpassed by the new container-
56
ships. These new container-carrying ships are designed to
travel routinely at speeds that are attained only by express
passenger liners. One modern containership can carry as
57
much cargo in one year as five of the old breakbulk carriers.
Aside from containerships, there have been other vessels
with different configurations developed in the trend away
49

from the breakbulk carrier. Of particular interest to the
military are the bargeships and the roll-on/roll-off (Ro/Ro)
58
ships. Each offers cost and service advantages over the
breakbulk carrier. They have more speed and can discharge
cargo at a faster rate than the conventional breakbulk carrier.
The functional characteristics of containerships, bargeships
and Ro/Ro ships will be described in detail in Chapter III
of this study.
Figure II-3 illustrates the trend away from the breakbulk
carrier and toward the containership, Ro/Ro ship and barge-ships
The specialization of the modern container, barge and
Ro/Ro ships present special problems when considering their
use in a military contingency. The most significant, particu-
larly in the case of the containership and Ro/Ro ship, is
their dependence on unloading equipment located at a pier
facility. This problem will be addressed in detail in Chap-
ter IV of this study.
It can be concluded that the increased speed and cargo
capacity of the ships found in today's transportation indus-
try are encouraging aspects when considering their use in
a military contingency action. However, discharging their
cargo without the use of an equipment intensive pier facility
poses a significant problem for the military.
I. MERCHANT MARINE AS VIABLE SUPPLEMENT TO THE NAVY
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, retired, and former




merchant marine for logistic support. He advocated using
the merchant marine in order to save money on the construc-
tion of logistic support ships. He argues that this money
could in turn be used for the construction of new warships
that the USN needs
.
Early in 1979, the General Accounting Office (GAO) , in
a study made for the House Appropriations Committee, issued
a report which said that the USN could save a substantial
amount of money by relying more on the merchant marine for
logistic support. The study says:
We believe that U.S. merchant ships are a viable
supplement to strict reliance on Navy support ships,
because the Navy anticipates using commercial assets
during wartime (and) commercial ships are reliable,
less costly to maintain, and can perform support
missions ef fectively . 61
According to GAO, the USN's own studies show that USN-
support ships are more expensive than merchant-marine ships,
USN-support ships operate less than their merchant-marine
6 2
counterparts, but they cost more to maintain.
The report to the House Committee included these find-
ings:
Navy ships are at sea about 20% of the time, while
commercial vessels are at sea 40-70%. The Navy's
maintenance costs per ship average about $2 million
a year, compared to $400,000 a year for a commercial
ship. Generally, Navy maintenance costs for amphi-
bious and auxiliary ships and equipment greatly ex-
ceed the costs of maintaining equally sized commer-
cial tankers and cargo ships, even though the Navy
ships operate much less often. 63
However, the current USN attitude toward the merchant








3. redundance of essential components, equipment and
systems
4. ability to maintain a 20-knot speed
5. necessary communications equipment
6. the crew's ability to conduct operations requiring
, 64
security clearances.
It can be concluded that a merchant ship can be more
economically operated than a similar USN support ship; how-
ever, there are several deficiencies characteristic of
merchant ships when considering their use in a combat
environment
.
J. CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE MERCHANT MARINE
On 1 August 1979 , the privately-owned merchant marine
had 531 ships available. Two hundred forty-five of these
vessels were assigned to regularly scheduled dry cargo runs.
The age of 62 of the dry cargo liners exceeded 2 5 years.
Not all of the 531 ships can be considered potential
military auxiliaries. The enormous size of some of the
newer ships make them completely dependent upon port facili-
ties for both loading and discharging of cargo. Their need
for channels 40 feet in depth seriously limit the number of
harbors they can enter. Another intangible reason, but of
vast importance to the total life of the nation, relates to
52

the U.S. dependence on raw materials for many of its manu-
factured goods including munitions. It is mandatory that
the transportation essential to the continued operation of
the U.S. economy be available without interruption. The
possibility of having to decide whether to use the merchant
marine to satisfy the demand of industry or to support the




President Eisenhower called the merchant marine the coun-
6 7
try's "Fourth Arm of Defense." According to recent testi-
mony before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee,
the "Fourth Arm of Defense" is deteriorating. As of May
1979, there were only 260 U.S. flag ships serving in foreign
commerce. It is estimated that almost all of them would
be needed for just the first few convoys sent to resupply
the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in the event of a war with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw
Pact allies.
At the outset of World War II, U.S. yards were building
200 merchant ships a year. In comparison, as of May 1979,
there are only 54 ships on order in U.S. yards.
U.S. flag ships are currently carrying only 4.6 percent
of America's foreign commerce. Part of the problem has been
rate cutting by Soviet shipping companies.
State Department aids now say that Panama under Omar
Torrijos will boost Panama Canal tolls 50 percent. This
53

will have an adverse effect on U.S. commercial shipping
4. 71interests
.
The scarcity of orders for both merchant marine and Navy
shipbuilding could result in the loss of some 45,00 to
7250,000 skilled shipyard workers over the next five years.
The FY80-construction subsidy for MARAD is 101 million
dollars, a reduction of 50 million dollars from FY79's pro-
gram. This will provide subsidies for only four ships: one
73barge carrier and three containerships . Vice Admiral C.R.
Bryan, USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, testifying
before the House Sea Power Subcommittee, said that the de-
clining shipbuilding activity may force shipyards out of
74business because of the lack of work.
Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN, then the Commander in
Chief, Atlantic, and Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic,
when appearing before the House Merchant Marine and Fisher-
ies Committee in 1980, said that NATO would need up to 6,000
merchant ships of 1,600-ton capacity or more in the event of
war in Europe. A European war, Admiral Kidd projects, could
require the delivery of 1.5 million men and their supplies
75from North America.
Admiral Kidd points out the serious problem that 2 5 per-
cent of NATO's ships are "flag of convenience ships," i.e.,
the ships ' companies are international in character and not
passport-carrying members of any NATO country. Their loyalty
7 6in time of crisis is questionable.
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Peter Kyros, special counsel to the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, states that he is not certain that
the U.S. has enough ships to support combat forces overseas
in any contingency. He points out that less than five per-
cent of critical imports come in U.S. flag ships. In a major
conflict, the U.S. does not have enough merchant ships to
support our fighting personnel overseas or to import criti-
77
cal materials to keep our war industries functioning.
According to Kyros, the Soviet Union outnumbers the U.S.
by a ratio of 4:1 in ocean-going-merchant and USN ships.
Thus in a national emergency, Soviet-merchant and Navy ships
78
would significantly outnumber their U.S. counterparts.
Kyros concludes that the U.S. does not have enough mer-
chant ships to support a large military organization such as
a Marine amphibious force (MAF) in time of emergency. Further-
more, not only is the number of ships insufficient but the
79
availability of the appropriate type ship is also absent.
Rear Admiral Bruce Keener II, USN, Commander of MSC, in
a testimony before the Senate Subcommittee early in 1980,
cited several points related to U.S. sealift. Due to the
increasing specialization of merchant ships, there continues
to be a downward trend in the size of the seagoing work
force. This is a major concern in military contingency
since ships without trained crews would be of little or no
, 80
value.
Fewer ships reduce the flexibility we have enjoyed
in the nearly four decades since World War II.
Their specialization makes them less effective for
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the over-the-beach type operations we can antici-
pate. Their size magnifies the impact of any loss
of ships or cargo—and we can expect heavy losses
in the initial phases of any future emergency in-
volving superpowers . 81
Admiral Keener points out that the USN ' s immediate
response force in a contingency consists of the USN fleet
and MSC assets. The latter include six specialized and
government-owned dry cargo ships, 22 chartered dry cargo
ships, 21 tankers in the nucleus fleet and another eight
privately-owned tankers under charter to MSC. Of the 150
ships in the NDRF, many are left over from World War II and
due to their age and deteriorated condition are not a relia-
82ble source of shipping. Admiral Keener also expressed
grave concern as to MSC's ability to man the 14 ships now
in the RRF . These ships are supposed to be in a state of
readiness that would allow them to be put into operation in
8 3five to ten days. Whether or not this can actually be
accomplished has not been determined.
Colonel Lane C. Kendall, USMCR, former Commercial Shipping
Advisor to the Commander of MSC, points out that in the past,
military services have made their plans based on the knowledge
that merchant shipping would be provided from one of three
sources:





2. the tramp segment which would make available obsolete
but still useful tonnage;
3. NDRF maintained by MARAD for emergency requirements
84
and capable of reactivation in 30 days.
Colonel Kendall goes on to point out that the liner fleet
is committed to container systems and is no longer a depend-
able resource for movement of breakbulk cargo. The tramp
segment disappeared as its World War II ships became obso-
lete. NDRF contains only a score or two of usable ships,
the once large number having been reduced due to age and
8 5
advanced technology.
It can be concluded from this section that the availa-
bility of U.S. merchant ships to support a military contin-
gency action is severely limited. In time of war, U.S.
government decision makers would have difficulty in deter-
mining whether to use merchant ships to keep a steady flow
of imported raw materials necessary for the production of
war goods or to use them in direct support of combat operations
There has been a significant reduction in U.S. ship-
building; therefore, the number of U.S. merchant ships is
expected to continue to decline. This may force many ship-
yards out of business and could have serious effects when
trying to increase production in time of war.




A brief history of the merchant marine in a military
contingency has been presented. It was determined that in
each war, commencing with World War I, the merchant marine
was not adequately prepared to meet military transportation
requirements. In response to this problem, U.S. maritime
support programs have been established. However, they have
not been completely effective. Some of the sealift problems
that the U.S. government has faced in past wars are existent
today. In terms of availability, there is a lack of a
sufficient number of U.S. merchant ships to support a major
conflict.
In addition, there are some new problems. U.S. ship-
building is on the decline. Ships that are being built are
specialized and their use by the military is severely con-
strained by the requirement for deep water, equipment-inten-
sive pier facilities. There is some speculation that ship-
building activities will transfer to foreign ownership. This
raises the question of the foreign owners ' eagerness or abil-
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III. FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MERCHANT SHIPS
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter II pointed out that the United States (U.S.) has
continually relied on the use of merchant ships in past
wars. The source of merchant ships and their availability
to support the military are aspects that were also discussed
in detail. This chapter will analyze the functional charac-
teristics of merchant ships and their suitability to perform
specialized tasks in support of a USN/USMC amphibious opera-
tion. Before this analysis is undertaken, a general compari-
son will be made of dry cargo carrying merchant ships and USN
amphibious ships. Despite the trend toward containerization
and container-carrying ships, breakbulk (general purpose
cargo) ships are still available in the U.S. flag merchant
fleet and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) . Therefore, an
analysis of the functional capabilities of the breakbulk ship
for use in an amphibious operation will be included.
The ships analyzed are projected to be in existence at
least through the year 19 84. The five categories of ships
that will be discussed are listed below:
1. passenger/cargo ships
2. breakbulk ships








a. lighter aboard ship (LASH)
b. Seabee
c. Trimariner
In evaluating their functional characteristics and suita-
bility, two basic roles for the merchant ships in an amphi-
bious operation are considered:
1. as a ship of the assault echelon (AE)
A ship utilized in this echelon would be required to
deliver those most critical assault elements needed to seize
a beach head and rapidly build up combat power ashore. The
AE is comprised primarily of combat (e.g., infantry) and
combat support units (e.g., artillery). Generally, the AE
consists of all assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equip-
2
ment and supplies required to conduct the assault landing.
2
.
as a ship of the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE)
A ship utilized in this echelon would be required to
deliver those remaining elements needed to sustain the
initial assault. The AFOE consists of combat service support
units (e.g., maintenance, engineer and supply) and would
normally be embarked in a mix of USN amphibious ships and
merchant ships. However, with the reduced amphibious ship-
ping assets of the USN, it is more reasonable to assume that
in a Marine amphibious force (MAF)-size operation, the AFOE
would be embarked almost entirely in merchant ships. The
* 3AFOE will normally commence landing on D +5. The requirement
*
See glossary of terms.
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to have shipping in the amphibious objective area (AOA)
,
approximately five days after the landing, precludes the
use of AE shipping to transport the units and supplies of
the AFOE.
Ships used in both echelons must be capable of offloading
in a hostile environment and in the open sea. This can pose
a problem of great magnitude when considering that merchant
ships are designed for loading and offloading at a pier
4facility located in a sheltered harbor. In evaluating the
merchant ships for use in the AE 'and AFOE, the assumption
is made that the amphibious task force (ATF) will face a
greater degree of enemy hostility in the AE. This assumption
is based on the following:
1. the AE includes the initial unloading of the landing
force and its equipment; it is tactical in character; any
enemy resistence in the AOA will, in all likelihood, be
encountered by the AE of the ATF
.
2. the AFOE is logistical in character; the commander
of the amphibious task force (CATF) will not order the AFOE
in until the AOA has been determined to be secure; the possi-
bility of enemy resistance during the AFOE has been signi-
ficantly reduced. Emphasis in the AFOE is on speed and
5
volume of unloading operations.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL SHIPS AND USN AMPHIBIOUS
SHIPS
1. Background
The primary objective of the dry cargo merchant ship
is to deliver a high volume of cargo as fast as possible
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with little or no damage. Meeting this objective enhances
the prospect of profit maximization. The merchant ship cap-
tain is concerned, first, with the safety of the ship;
second, with the safety of the cargo; and third, with the
expeditious delivery of cargo. If a merchant ship developed
mechanical trouble that would cause extensive damage to the
ship with continued operation, the captain would cease opera-
tion and commence corrective maintenance. This would, in
effect, sacrifice the expeditious delivery of the cargo for
the safety of the ship. The captain of a USN amphibious
ship would not have the same priorities. If he were involved
in an amphibious operation under hostile conditions, expedi-
tious delivery of the men, equipment and supplies of the
landing force is of paramount importance to the success of
the operation. The ship's captain would, in all likelihood,
risk extensive damage to the ship in order to meet this
7
objective.
The difference in objectives of the USN amphibious
ship and the dry cargo merchant ship results in significant
differences in design, manning and on board equipment. As
will be pointed out in a later section, these differences
are important considerations when evaluating the use of
merchant ships in an amphibious operation.
2 . Manning
To illustrate the large difference in personnel,
the USN amphibious cargo ship (LKA)-117, requires 330 personnel
to operate under tactical conditions. Whereas in normal
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point to point operations, a typical merchant general pur-
pose cargo ship, such as the SS American Challenger, requires
g
only 40 personnel. Table III-l is a comparison of the
manning requirements for both ships
.
The USN amphibious ship must maintain personnel at
all stations essential for the operation and defense of the
ship. Operational or defense demands may require the ship
to get underway immediately. Therefore, the bridge, the
signal bridge, the combat operations center, the communica-
tions and engineering stations all have to be fully manned.
Also the debarkation control center, the surface and air
debark stations, the cargo holds, the ship's boats, the
emergency boat repair station, the repair party stations
and the weapons must be manned to the greatest extent possi-
ble. An LKA has approximately 100 men allotted to the ship
9
to handle cargo.
Commercial ships on the other hand depend on manpower
resources located at the port facilities for the loading
and unloading of cargo. The crew of the merchant ship pro-
vides the necessary manpower to operate the ship from one
point to the next and the necessary personnel to support
requirements such as the manning of the galley and the
ship's store.
3 . Communications
The USN amphibious ship must be capable of sailing
in formation with other ships of the task force. Continuous
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communication, particularly in severe weather conditions,
is a must. In addition, the amphibious ships must be equipped
with the capability of communicating with the landing force
once ashore. The extensive communication network requires
space for operators and maintenance personnel. The ship
must also be configured with ample room to accommodate the
communications equipment.
The commercial ship does not have a sophisticated
network of communications. It is not designed to carry a
landing force. A network designed for communication in a
tactical situation is not necessary for normal day to day
operations. The commercial ship does not have to maneuver
in formation, at various speeds and under severe conditions.
Therefore, the communication network on a commercial ship
is relatively simple compared to a USN amphibious ship. To
illustrate, Sealand Inc., the world's largest privately-
owned container shipper, has a total of 60 ships which call
at 122 ports in 4 6 countries. Sealand Inc. puts communica-
tion relatively low on the priority list. This is typical
of other containership operators. Sealand Inc. vessels are
very rarely at sea more than seven days and are usually at
a major port every two weeks. Apart from emergencies, crew
illnesses and injuries, there is little need for ship-to-
shore contact. Only twice in a ten-year period did one ship
manager in a container shipping company have to contact ships
to order a change of course. Sealand Inc.'s policy toward
12communications is to keep it simple and reliable.
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Systems on the USN ship are designed to provide
redundancy for increased survivability. The propulsion system
is of main concern. Speed and maneuverability are extremely
important in a combat situation. Therefore the manning
level of engineering departments of the USN amphibious ship
13
is significantly increased over that of a commercial ship. ~
5. Ship Design Consideration
A major design difference between amphibious ships
and commercial ships relates to the delivery of landing
force personnel and equipment to shore. Helicopter opera-
tions, wet-wells for efficient operation of preloaded boats
and amphibious vehicles and special ramps for the discharge
of equipment are all characteristics that distinguish USN
. . . 14
amphibious ships from their commercial counterparts.
USN ships are designed to survive despite large open-
ings in the hull. For example, an LKA-113 class could sur-
vive with two, possibly three, compartments flooded. On
the other hand, a commercial cargo ship can survive but one
15flooded compartment.
6. Electronics
USN amphibious ships have radar suites designed for
defense and ship control, modern navigation equipment, at
least three internal powered telephones, and general selec-
tive announcing systems. Whereas, commercial ships have
only surface radar and simple navigation suites designed to




Although USN amphibious ships are not classified
as combatant-type ships, they do have weapons for self-
defense. A typical close in weapons system (CIWS) consists
of 20 mm machine guns, firing 3,000 rounds per minute. The
"Gatling gun" as it is called can lock onto a target and
18
shred it within a fraction of a second.
Commercial ships do not carry weapons; therefore,
it can be concluded that their probability of survival in a




A USN ship such as the LKA-113 class, besides its
primary power source, has two 500 kilowatt (kw) emergency
19diesel generators. Therefore , the ship has three separately
located sources of power. The lack of vital functions such
as main plant auxiliary equipment, steering, communications,
weapons and operation of pumps is minimized. Generally,
the commercial cargo ship has one emergency diesel-driven
generator of sufficient capacity (50-100 kw) to provide
limited emergency lighting and to light off the main steam
20plant without an external source of power. The possibility
of losing vital functions is a good deal greater in the mer-
chant ship.
9. Fire Control
The USN amphibious ship is designed and manned to
control several fires at one time. A typical amphibious
ship such as the LKA-113 has smoke detection and fog foam
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flooding in the cargo holds. In addition, amphibious ships
have a damage control organization, three damage control
lockers with equipment for fire and flooding control and
21
three trained control repair parties.
The commercial ship usually has a single fore and
aft fire main supplied by two fire pumps located in the engine
room. It is usually highly dependent on early detection of
a fire and has the ability to extinguish a fire with a finite
22
amount of CO- or fog foam.
10 . Living Accommodations
Due to the significant difference in the personnel
capacities of USN cargo ship and commercial cargo ship,
there is a large difference in the living accommodations
and personnel support spaces. As already pointed out, USN
crews are much larger, plus living space must be provided
for embarked personnel of the landing force. There are
more berthing compartments, messing areas, lounges, heads,
showers, galleys, scullerys, incinerators, office spaces,
store rooms, shops, air conditioners, refrigerators and
water supply in a USN amphibious ship than in a merchant
ship. All these factors have an effect on the ship's design
and amount of personnel required to man the personnel-
support areas. If merchant ships are to be used in an amphi-
bious operation, the billeting for the additional crew and
members of the landing force is a major consideration.
Figures III-l through III-9 pictorially summarize the
amphibious-ship types used by the USN.
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It can be concluded from this section that there
are large differences between USN amphibious ships and dry
cargo commercial ships. The USN ship is built to accomplish
its mission in a hostile environment. In order to do this,
survivability of the ship is the prime concern in its design.
The commercial dry cargo ship is built for efficient move-
ment of cargo from one point to another as cheaply as possi-
ble. Economical considerations are of prime concern in the
design of the merchant ship. The differences in the two
ships have to be considered when planning shipping require-
ments for a USN/USMC amphibious operation. The probability
of survival in a hostile environment for a merchant ship
in its present configuration is a great deal less than a
USN amphibious ship.
C. SUITABILITY OF MERCHANT SHIPS FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
1. Introduction
This section provides a more detailed analysis of
the suitability of each type of merchant ship to function in
an amphibious operation. Each ship type will be analyzed
for its suitability in the AE with and without major modifi-
cations. Further, it will be analyzed for its suitability
in the AFOE without major modification. The type of merchant





a. Merchant Ship in the AE
As pointed out in the previous section, merchant
ships have crew and working space for about 40 to 45 person-
nel. Although there is some room for flexibility, an attempt
to expand the capacity of a merchant ship to accommodate
some 300 USN crewmen is not possible. Major modifications
would have to be made and this would result in a significant
reduction in the ship's payload. The extent of the modifi-
cation needed can be estimated by examining the nature of the
ship and the type and amount of cargo-handling equipment on
board. These facts have to be considered in tailoring the
manning level to perform the mission of an amphibious ship.
Table III-2 lists appropriate crew estimates for the various
types of merchant ships if they were to be used in the AE of
an amphibious operation. Depending upon what type of merchant
ship is being considered, the required manning level ranges
from 250 to 400 personnel.
A merchant ship designed for 40 to 4 5 civilian
crew members has approximately 4000 square feet (sq. ft.) of
23living space or 90 sq. ft. per man. A USN crew man is
allotted 25 sq. ft. Therefore, 4000 sq. ft. of living
space could possibly be converted to provide living accommo-
dations for 160 crew men. This is far short of the 250 to
400 crew men required to man a ship participating in the AE
of an amphibious operation. The additional crew would need
from 2250 to 6000 sq. ft. of living space. Assuming the
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height of the living space is ten feet (ft.)/ the additional
cubic feet (cu. ft.) requirement could range from 22,500
to 50,000. The average cargo ship has approximately 160,000
25
cu. ft. of cargo space. Therefore, the additional crew
would consume from 14 percent to 37 percent of the ship's
cargo-carrying volume for living space alone. This does
not take into consideration the living accommodations of
the additional landing-force personnel and the facilities
required to support this additional crew and embarked per-
sonnel from the landing force.
Major modifications in the merchant ship would
also be required in other areas. One of the more challenging
problems in designing an amphibious ship for the USN is to
find ways to accommodate the extensive array of communications/
2 6
electronics (COMM/ELECT) equipment. As discussed, the
merchant ship is built with only the most basic COMM/ELECT
equipment. Major modifications to facilitate this equipment
would be necessary prior to participation in the AE of an
amphibious operation.
Modification would also have to be made to the
damage-control equipment, the emergency-power sources, the
fire-fighting equipment, and the defensive weaponry, to
name a few.
It can be concluded that commercial ships that
normally operate on a narrow profit margin and are designed
for a specialized commercial operation could not be modified
on a short notice to be used in the AE of an amphibious
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operation. The time-consuming and extensive modification
would result in considerably less payload capacity. This
would render the merchant ship uneconomical for use as a
commercial carrier.
b. Merchant Ships in the AFOE
In the AFOE which usually commences at D + 5 as
previously pointed out, the enemy threat will have lessened
considerably. Consequently, this fact weighs heavily in
analyzing the use of commercial ships for service in the
AFOE. The problems of ship control, survivability and ship
unloading still exist in AFOE; however, these problems are
different from that of the AE. AFOE includes shipping used
to transport units, supplies and equipment required for the
27buildup of a beach head and to resupply the landing force.
Assault follow-on shipping is echeloned into the objective
area upon request of the CATF . This will not be done until
the objective area is considered secure enough to do so.
In the AFOE, military personnel are now available
to offload ships. More sophisticated material handling equip-
ment (e.g., floating cranes, causeways) can be moved in,
set up and utilized. Landing craft can move in a more logisti-
cal fashion from ship-to-shore. Shipboard-tactical communi-
cation, although still necessary, would not have to be as
sophisticated. Temporary communications equipment placed
aboard merchant ships to cover tactical warning and maneuver-
ing circuits would be sufficient. Survivability character-
istics such as weaponry, redundancy in engineering systems,
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sophisticated fire-control and pumping systems would not
be as important aboard ships in the AFOE as compared to
AE ships
.
It can be concluded that the criteria set forth
for evaluating the use of merchant ships in the AFOE is
significantly different than that of the AE
.
3. USN's Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)
The USN has recently taken delivery on its first
LCAC, the JEFF B, at the Naval Coastal Systems Center in
Panama City, Florida. The JEFF B, pictured in figure III-
10, has a gross weight of 325,000 pounds (lb.) and has
28
achieved speeds of more than 50 knots (kn.) . The
LCAC has the ability to proceed beyond the water's edge to
offload its payload. This flexibility can be translated
into tactical surprise, increased survivability and a rapid
buildup of forces ashore. The LCAC has been designed to
operate from the well decks of amphibious ships. Riding
on a cushion of air a few inches (in.) above the surface of
water or land, the craft will be able to transition from
the sea through the surf and across the beach to discharge
29its payload on hard ground. Because of the feasibility
and utility of employing the LCAC by the amphibious forces
of the future, it will be evaluated for use with each type
of merchant ship addressed in this study.
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4 . Analysis of Each Merchant-Ship Type for Use in an
Amphibious Operation
a. Cargo/Passenger Ship
This ship has four major shortcomings for use in
the AE:
(1) the lack of COMM/ELECT and combat-information-center
equipment
(2) the inability to embark/debark by helicopter, requiring
the dangerous use of cargo nets for troop debarkation
(3) the inability to carry LCAC vehicles
(4) a severely limited damage-control capability
It can be concluded that the cargo/passenger ship
is not suitable for use in the AE.
In order to consider this ship for use, a USN
crew of 29 9 men would be needed for an amphibious assault
operation. Existing crew accommodations and some cargo
space would have to be reconfigured to provide berthing,
messing, sanitary facilities, medical spaces and other
personnel-support facilities. In addition to the crew accommo-
dations, the following modifications would be required:
(1) convert 118,000 cu. ft. of cargo space to accommodate
175 additional troops
(2) install CIWS for self-defense
(3) install surface-search radar, signal bridge, combat-
information center, communication central and an internal-
communication system




(5) install an emergency diesel generator
(6) install eight landing crafts such as the LCM-6
pictured in figure III-ll
(7) install a helicopter-landing platform with flight
operations and safety equipment.
The cost of these modifications is estimated to be 105 million
31dollars. Even with these extensive modifications, the ship
would still be inferior to a modern USN amphibious ship in
the areas of troop and cargo capacity, debarkation capability
and survivability. This is primarily due to the ship's com-
mercial design and standards as opposed to that of the military
Because of personnel capacity, the combination
cargo/passenger ship is useful in the AFOE. The ship's large
superstructure and relatively spacious civilian crew and
passenger/tourist accommodations could be modified without
major rework to accommodate 300 USN crew and the 500 embarked
troops of the landing force. If major modifications were to
32be effected, the ship could handle 1,500 troops.
A major benefit of the cargo/passenger ship is
the four on-board container gantries. These give the ship
the self-sustaining capability to unload containers directly
*
from the ship into a lighter for ease in ship-to-shore
movement
.
It can be concluded that the cargo/passenger ship
is very useful in the AFOE because of its troop-carrying
See glossary of terms.
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capacity and container-carrying/unloading capabilities. How-
ever, due to commercial airlines providing relatively cheap
and fast intercontinental transportation, there are presently
very few cargo/passenger ships in service. Four ships under
American flag are classified as cargo/passenger vessels.
The Delta Line's Santa Mercedes class shown in figure 111-12
carries 125 passengers as well as provides 447,000 cu. ft.
of cargo space. These 21 kn. ships are 547 ft. long, 79 ft.
wide and have a 27-foot draft. They were built in 1963 and
1964 and are assigned to Western Hemisphere trade. There are
33
no new cargo/passenger ships planned for construction.
b. Breakbulk Ship (General Purpose Cargo Ship)
The breakbulk ship can be examined in relation
to the LKA-113 Charleston class amphibious ship pictured in
figure III-4. The Charleston class ship is essentially a
commercial cargo ship; however, it has all of the equipment
and the proper design to operate in a tactical environment.
The merchant-breakbulk ship has a large cargo-
carrying capacity and functions well in a commercial environ-
ment, steaming alone from one port to another. Cargo is
loaded and unloaded with material-handling equipment and
longshoremen available in the port facilities. As a ship in
the AE of an amphibious operation, it has many of the same
problems of the cargo/passenger ship:
CD lack of sufficient crew (30 men compared to the
required 300 for an amphibious operation)
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(2) lack of space (exclusive of cargo holds) for the
necessary COMM/ELECT equipment
(3) lack of surface space for helicopter landing (the
deck configuration makes landing of a helicopter not feasible)
34
(4) lack of capability to be replenished at sea.
Without major modification the breakbulk ship could not be
used in the AE of an amphibious operation. In order to make
the breakbulk ship a suitable carrier of troops and equipment,
the following modifications would have to be accomplished;
(1) convert existing crew accommodations in superstructure
to provide USN operational spaces such as a communications
center and billeting for ship's officers
(2) convert 300,000 cu. ft. of cargo space on the second
deck to accommodate the billeting of a 301-man crew and 30
troops of the landing force (this would include all the
support facilities)
(3) install CIWS with magazines and fire-control systems
(4) install surface-search radar, signal bridge, combat-
operation center, communication central, crypto room and
internal communications
(5) install USN damage-control systems and emergency-
pumping system
(6) install one additional ship's service generator
(7) install one additional emergency-diesel generator
(8) install four mechanized landing crafts (LCM) -8
(9) install a helicopter landing platform with associated




The estimated cost to make the above modifications would be
86 million dollars.
Even with extensive modifications, the converted
breakbulk ship would still be inferior to the modern USN
amphibious cargo ship in boom size and number, cargo accessi-
bility, cargo capacity, cargo flow to air debark spot and
landing-craft capacity. The probability of survivability
is lessened because of the design of the commercial ship.
It would have limited helicopter-debark capability. It is
not capable of transporting the LCAC either before or after
. . . 37
modification.
Many of the characteristics that make the break-
bulk ship profitable as a commercial carrier, also make it
a useful ship for use in the AFOE. The breakbulk ship has
the following advantages:
(1) it can travel at relatively fast speeds, 20 kn. or
better
(2) it has a large cargo capacity (this would be reduced
somewhat by adding tactical features)
(3) it has self-sustaining capability as a result of
38
an on-deck 70-foot boom.
Even in the AFOE, the breakbulk ship does have one major
limitation. Despite the ship's self-sustained loading
*
and unloading capability, it relies on stevedores located
at the various ports to operate the booms. Therefore in
See glossary of terms.
80

an amphibious operation, personnel to operate the booms
would have to be added to the crew.
Despite the trend toward containerization, not
all cargo can be or will be containerized. There will still
be a percentage of the cargo that will be palletized or
packaged in some other form. Currently 77 percent of defense
ocean dry cargo goes by containers. MSC officials say that
may be the maximum since the rest of the cargo is either
39
oversized or not suited for containers. It is in the
transportation of general purpose cargo that the breakbulk
ship fills a very important void. However, as discussed in
Chapter II of this study, the growing emphasis in U.S. ship-
building is on non-self-sustaining containerships . The number
of breakbulk carriers is diminishing and present indications
are that no U.S. operator plans to buy new ones. Figure
111-13 is a picture of a breakbulk ship, the SS American
Courier. It is one of the many merchant ships chartered by
MSC. It is shown offloading an LCM-8.
c . Modern Ro/Ro Ship
The commercial Ro/Ro ships can be compared to the
USN tank landing ship (LST) pictorially displayed in figure
III-9. The USN LST is the nearest amphibious counterpart
to the commercial Ro/Ro ship. It is primarily designed as
a vehicle carrier and can rapidly load and unload its rolling
stock at any commercial port with a heavy pier facility.
The LST, on the other hand, is designed and rein-
forced so that the ship can be deliberately beached and
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retracted under normal conditions. The LST is mainly a
vehicle carrier. The Newport class LST-1179 has the capa-
bility to unload trucks and tanks by a ramp-over-the-bow.
The ramp is 110 ft. long, aluminum in construction and has
40
a 75-ton capacity. The LST also has a stern gate that
allows loading and unloading an amphibious vehicle such as
the landing vehicle tracked personnel (LVTP7) pictured in
figure 111-14. The LST can debark the amphibious vehicle
in deep water while it is underway.
The Ro/Ro on the other hand falls far short of
the amphibious capabilities of the USN LST. The Ro/Ro, like
any other commercial ship, cannot be beached without receiving
severe or terminal damage. Therefore, unloading has to be
accomplished at a pier by use of a ramp. The dry well-deck
of a Ro/Ro ship can accommodate a LCAC vehicle; however,
launching and retrieving the vehicle would not be feasible
since the deck is ten ft. or more above the waterline.
Further, the stern openings are less than half of the required
size for passage of a LCAC vehicle.
The Ro/Ro ship has all the other limitations that
are characteristic of the commercial cargo/passenger ship and
breakbulk ship already analyzed. These include:
(1) shortage of necessary COMM/ELECT equipment and facilities
(2) limitations in crew and embarked personnel of the
landing force
(3) lack of billeting accommodations for an increased
crew and members of the landing force
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(4) inadequate damage-control capabilities
(5) lack of helicopter-landing pads, requiring troop
debarkation by the dangerous use of cargo nets
. . 41
(6) lack of underway-replenishment capability.
Amphibious vehicles are used for the delivery of
troops in the tactical assault. The unmodified Ro/Ro ship
does not have the capability to debark these vehicles in
deep water. This eliminates a Ro/Ro from consideration for
use in the AE. Further, the inability to offload vehicles
such as tanks, trucks, jeeps, towed and self-propelled artillery
pieces directly to the beach or onto a floating causeway ne-
gates the most important attributes of this ship, i.e., its
ability to carry military rolling stock.
In order to consider the Ro/Ro for operation in
the AE of an amphibious operation, the following modifications
would be required:
(.1) existing crew accommodations in the superstructure
would have to be converted to provide billeting for the
ship's officers.
(2) approximately 249,600 cu. ft. of vehicle/cargo space
would have to be converted to accommodate the 24 3-man crew
and the 300 embarked troops of the landing force.
(.3) one helicopter landing position would have to be
installed with operational and safety equipment.
(4) a CIWS would have to be installed fore and aft for
defense of the ship.
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(5) damage control, pumps and fire-fighting equipment
would have to be installed.
(6) one emergency generator would have to be installed.
(7) two LCM-6's would have to be installed.
The estimated cost of this list of modifications is 82
42
million dollars.
But even with the necessary modifications, the
Ro/Ro ship still has one major shortcoming that eliminates
it from consideration for use in the AE. The amphibious
vehicles that would be embarked aboard the Ro/Ro ship are
required for use as troop carriers in the assault. In order
to debark these vehicles, major ship rework would be required.
This would include rebuilding the hull access, the ramps, the
ramp support and the surrounding hull structures. Major re-
work of this nature would be unreasonably expensive and
43time-consuming
.
The structure of a Ro/Ro vessel is designed specif-
ically for commercial operation with the ship tied up in calm
water to a heavy pier. Only the ramp has to be strong enough
to act as a short bridge between the ship and the pier. In
the AFOE, it is highly unlikely that a heavy commercial pier
will be available. Therefore, unloading must be accomplished
onto a floating causeway similar to the one pictured in
figure 111-15. The M-60 tank currently in the USMC ' s inven-
tory weighs 60 tons. Offloading a vehicle of this size onto
a floating causeway would be extremely hazardous in calm
44flat seas and not feasible in heavy rolling seas.
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The Ro/Ro ship, because of its vehicle-carrying
capacity, has tremendous potential in the AFOE; however,
the cargo offload problem must be solved first.
At present, American-owned Ro/Ro ships that have
the potential for use in USN/USMC operations are the United
States Navy Ship (USNS) Comet, the USNS Sealift, the
Admiral William M. Callaghan, the Defiance class (four ships)
,
the new Maine class (four ships) , the Ponce de Leon class
(five ships) , the Lurline class (two ships) and the Great
4Land class (three ships)
.
The USNS Comet, pictured in figure 111-16, is the
oldest of the Ro/Ro ships. It was put into service by MSC
in 1958. The Comet has a stern gate and a total of four side
ports. Ramps for the side ports can be handled by the ship's
booms and can be stowed on the main deck. Ro/Ro access is
46provided to all decks by internal ramps.
MSC acquired the Sealift that is pictured in
figure 111-17 in 1967. It has a stern gate and side port




The Admiral William M. Callaghan pictured in
figure 111-18 is operated by Sunexport Holdings and is on
long term charter to MSC. It is noted for its gas turbine
propulsion system. It has the same basic stern and side port
48
arrangement as the Comet and Sealift.
The Defiance class pictured in figure 111-19
includes four ships. The first was built in 1969 by
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Litton-Ingalls for Moore-McCormack Lines. They are now
operated by American Export Lines of New York. These ships
are primarily containerships having only one deck available
for Ro/Ro cargo. These ships have a stern ramp and one side
49
port each side aft.
The four ships of the Maine type pictured in
figure 111-20 are built by Bath Iron Works for the States
Steamship Company. They are multi-purpose ships capable of
handling all types of Ro/Ro cargo. Ramps allow Ro/Ro access
to all decks. A large side port is located about the middle
of the ship on the starboard side and a smaller side port is
located on the port side forward.
The first of the five Ponce de Leon class ships
shown in figure 111-21 was built in 1968 by Sun Shipbuilding
for the Transamerican Trailer Transport Company (TTT) . One
ship is operated by TTT and the other four by the Puerto Rican
Maritime Authority. These ships carry trailers with special
tractors and ramps provided by the ports serviced. Loading
and unloading is done through three side ports located in the
starboard side. No stern gate is provided in the Ponce
class.
The two ships of the Lurline class, shown in
52figure 111-22, are similar to the Ponce class ships.
The three ships of the Great Land class Ro/Ro
shown in figure 111-23 are an extension of the Ponce class
ships. The Great Land class differs from the Ponce type in
that it has openings in the transcom. Normal operations
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would involve loading in the transom and offloading from
53
the main deck to the pier.
The Baltic Eagle, pictured in figure 111-24 and
built in Finland for its London owners, is the latest custom-
built Ro/Ro vessel. It is ice strengthened for vigorous
North Sea and Baltic service and was built to allow for
future conversion to permit substantially increased number
of passengers. Both of these characteristics enhance its
54potential for use in a military contingency.
The Ro/Ro method of transferring cargo between
ship and shore represents the ultimate in vessel self-suffi-
ciency. Over the past decade, advances in Ro/Ro technology
have taken place principally in the fields of access ramps
and internal ramping arrangements . The need for a pier
facility for loading and unloading is still the major obsta-
cle for use in the AFOE of an amphibious operation. This
problem will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV.
d. LASH Barge Carrier
The LASH has the capability of carrying barges
which speeds the loading and unloading functions . The
barges are handled by means of a gantry crane which rolls
out beyond the stern of the ship and drops a lifting structure
onto the barge. Barges are lifted to deck level, transported
forward by the gantry and lowered into one of the holds or
stowed on deck. Some LASH configurations also have the
capability of carrying containers . In container-carrying
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LASH ships, the lifting structure is configured to the
containers
.
As with the other commercial ships discussed
thus far, the LASH ship has many shortcomings when consider-
ing its use in the AE of an amphibious operation. These
shortcomings include:
(1) inadequate COMM/ELECT
(2) inadequate damage-control bapabilities
56
(3) inadequate crew and troop accommodations.
In addition, there are limitations that are
unique to the LASH barge carrier. There is total dependence
on a single barge gantry for loading and unloading. Mechani-
cal failure of the gantry would result in no alternative
means to unload cargo. The gantry-cycle time (time to unload
57
one barge is 15 minues) is too slow under the combat con-
ditions of the AE . Another consideration is the seastate.
Current estimates indicate that barges can be unloaded and
recovered in swells up to eight ft.—a sea condition that
5 8
cannot always be counted on in an amphibious operation.
There is one favorable characteristic that the
LASH has when compared to the other commercial ships addressed
thus far. The 500-ton lift capacity and large clear topside
configuration raise the possibility of the LASH being suit-
able as a LCAC vehicle carrier. There is space for si_x
LCAC vehicles on the typical LASH ship; however, due to the
shortcomings cited, the LASH vessel in its unmodified con-
59figuration is not suitable for use in the AE.
88

The weather deck of the LASH ship has potential
for the storage of vehicles, landing craft and possibly the
LCAC. Below-deck spaces could be used for vehicles and
cargo that could be loaded on barges or into containers
.
The following modifications would be needed before
consideration could be given to use the LASH ship in the
AE:
(1) convert existing crew accommodations to provide USN
operational spaces, communication central and billeting for
ship's officers
(2) convert one cargo cell for the billeting of 300
troops of the landing force
(3) convert one hold for the billeting of 330 crew
members requiring 8,580 sq. ft. and personnel-support
facilities requiring 28,050 sq. ft.
(4) provide adapter hardware to permit the gantry to
hoist an LCM-8 and LCAC vehicle
(5) install two helicopter-landing positions with asso-
ciated flight operational and safety equipment
(6) install weapons system for defense of the ship for-
ward and aft
(7) install surface search radar, signal bridge, communi-
cation central and internal communications system
(8) install USN damage-control equipment, pumps and fire-
fighting equipment.




Even with the prescribed modifications, the
ship's usefulness in the AE is questionable. Barges loaded
with cargo, vehicles or containers are not suitable for use
in an assault. In the AE the only possible use for a modi-
fied LASH ship would be the delivery of landing craft or
LCAC vehicles. When the capacity is compared against the
cost of ship modification and the survivability risk, it is
not sensible to use the modified LASH barge carrier in the
assault phase of an amphibious operation.
On the other hand, the LASH ship offers great
potential in the AFOE. In this phase of the amphibious opera-
tion, quick unloading is not as critical. The volume of cargo
is more important. Building up the logistical support area
with the necessary equipment and supplies to sustain the
landing force ashore is of the utmost importance in the AFOE.
An 8 x 8 x 20-foot container can carry up to 20 tons of cargo.
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The LASH can carry 228 of these containers. The 500-ton
barges that the LASH is capable of carrying can be preloaded
with containers, breakbulk cargo or vehicles. The LASH's
self-unloading capability makes it particularly suitable for
an amphibious operation. The fact that it is solely dependent
on one gantry is still a disadvantage in the AFOE. However,
rapid unloading, although still important, is not as criti-
cal in the AFOE as it is in the AE. The risk of a mechanical
breakdown of the gantry is still a concern; however, more time




Another advantage is that the pre-loaded
barges can serve as temporary storage facilities. They
are called floating dumps and preclude the establishing
of elaborate logistical facilities ashore.
In conclusion, because of its cargo capacity,
self-unloading ability and the capability of providing
floating dumps, the LASH is a vessel with high potential
for use in the AFOE of an amphibious operation.
Figure 111-25 shows a full length view of
the Delta Steamship Line's C-9 LASH ship lying at anchor
while working barges. The large barge crane on the exten-
der rails at the stem of the ship is unloading a barge
and a tug is waiting to receive the barge at the moment
that it is released from the load frmae . Forward on
the ship is the container crane. On these ships, cranes
64
are carried in the forward cells and barges aft. Cur-




e. Seabee Barge Carrier
Similar to the LASH, the Seabee uses barges
and containers on the upper deck to speed loading and
unloading, to function as storage spaces in transit and
as vehicles for further cargo movement from port terminals
The Seabee loads barges horizontally from the stern on
three deck levels. These decks could be used for storing
landing craft vehicles and other cargo in place of barges.
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As a potential LCAC carrier, the Seabee has
fewer problems with landing than the LASH ship. The
fore and aft size of the LASH gantry accommodates a 30-
foot distance between lift points. The LCAC is about
93 ft. long. That means 30 ft. will be under the gan-
try and the remaining 63 ft. will be extended further
aft. Therefore a special adapter is required for the
66
'
LASH gantry. The Seabee offloading is accomplished
by a stern elevator with a 2000-ton capacity. Therefore
is is more suitable for LCAC unloading. The one limita-
tion is that the Seabee has the capability of launching
one craft every 30 to 40 minuts; more than double the time
of the LASH.
The LASH has a motion compensation device
that allows it to unload in swells of up to eight ft.
The Seabee does not have a device of this type. Conse-
quently, the craft being unloaded would take the wave action
directly. This could have damaging effect on supplies and
equipment loaded into containers and on to barges. The
LCAC is of light construction and is very susceptible to
damage with rough handling. Thus, the Seabee has a serious
shortcoming if the LCAC has to be offloaded in anything
but a calm seastate.
Since the failure of the stern elevator could com-
pletely eliminate the Seabee' s offloading capability, a fail-
fi 7
ure occurring during the AE would have serious effects.
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The equipment and supplies would essentially be locked into
the Seabee with no alternative means of offloading.
The Seabee, as the other merchant-ship configura-
tions discussed, lacks the essential equipment for operation
in the AE:
(1) lack of adequate COMM/ELECT equipment and spaces
to house it
(2) lack of damage- control equipment
(3) lack of helicopter-landing area
(4) lack of living accommodations for the crew and
embarked personnel
(5) no underway replenishment capability
(6) lack of appropriate cargo in the AE for 1000-ton
barges
6 8
(7) unsuitability of its containers for use in the AE.
It can be concluded that the unmodified Seabee is not suitable
for use in the AE because of the reasons cited above.
In order to consider the Seabee for use in the
AE, the following modifications would have to be made:
(1) conversion of 44,850 sq. ft. of cargo space for
billeting and personnel-support functions for 3 73 crew mem-
bers and 300 embarked troops
(2) modification of support pedestals to accommodate
vehicles, landing craft and the LCAC
(3) installation of landing areas for helicopters and
their associated operational and safety equipment
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(4) installation of CIWS forward and aft for the defense
of the ship
(5) installation of surface search radar, signal bridge,
yardarms , combat- information center, communication central
and internal communication system
(6) installation of one emergency diesel generator
(7) installation of damage- control equipment, pumps and
fire- fighting equipment.
The estimated cost of the modifications is 102
million dollars.
The modified Seabee would have substantial capacity
for transporting landing craft, LCAC's and other vehicles.
The Seabee elevator has the capacity to hoist landing crafts
or LCAC's loaded with battle tanks; however, this has not
been tested and the sensitivity of the elevator to seastate
71
makes this practice questionable.
It can be concluded that the type of cargo (1000-
ton barges), the 40-minute cycle time for unloading craft,
and the sensitivity to seastate make the Seabee unacceptable
for the AE even with the modifications listed above.
As with the LASH, the Seabee has the advantages
of breakbulk cargo, containers, and pre-loaded barges with
up to 1,000 tons of cargo. Due to its self-sustaining quality,
it does not require a pier facility to unload. The elevator
located on the stern of the ship has the capability to go
below the water line, therefore, barges can be floated and
picked up in the open ocean. The large capacity of the
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elevator (2,000 tons) gives the ship the capacity to unload
or pick up outsized loads. The Seabee barge carrier also
has the capability to carry warping tugs, cranes, mooring
gear and other equipment that can be utilized to establish
a barge-handling, discharge and offshore storage facility.
Chapter IV of this study will address this facility in depth.
Due to the above reasons , it is concluded that
the Seabee barge carrier has potential for use in the AFOE.
Its dependence on its single barge elevator for loading and
unloading is still a significant shortcoming; however, it
is not as critical in the AFOE as it is in the AE.
The climate leans more toward logistical loading
and unloading and there is more flexibility as well as time,
men and equipment to deal with a problem such as the failure
of the Seabee elevator. Figure III- 26 shows a Seabee ship
at sea carrying both barges and containers. Notice the
stern elevator locked into sailing position between the main
deck and upper deck. This ship is self-sustaining with respect
to its barges, but requires support and assistance with con-
tainers from an external crane, capable of lifting and placing
72
containers into position on the upper deck of the ship.
Currently there are three Seabee vessels sailing under a U.S.
flag. 73
f. Trimariner Barge Carrier
The Trimariner is a new concept in commercial
shipping and has only recently been produced. The fact that
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it has a wet well-deck gives the ship vast potential for use
in an amphibious operation. The ship can be compared to
the USN amphibious dock landing ship (LSD) , pictured in
figure III- 8. The Trimariner's cargo capacity is twice that
of the LSD. Its speed, however, is significantly less. The
USN LSD is capable of 22 kn., whereas, the Trimariner is
capable of only 16 kn.
The Trimariner's well-deck is open at the stern.
The USN LSD has an enclosed well-deck with a stern gate.
Ballast tanks allow change in draft. In order to load, the
ship is ballasted and the loaded barges are warped into the
well-deck. The ship is then deballasted and the loading is
complete. Offloading is merely the above procedure in
reverse.
The biggest advantage of the Trimariner in the
AE would be its ability to embark large numbers of landing
craft. It has the capacity for 50 LCM-6's, compared to 20
in the LSD and nine in the amphibious transport dock (LPD)
.
The speed of the ship is a significant shortcoming
USN ships are designed to steam in formation at 20 kn. for
extended periods of time. The Trimariner would require
the fleet to travel at 16 kn. This is considered unsuitable
77for an ATF.
The Trimariner's open well-deck restricts cargo
to barges or other types of craft. The USN amphibious ship
with its closed stern gates is capable of carrying other
96

types of cargo in the wet-well, e.g., vehicles can be driven
directly into the wet-well. This is a capability not possi-
78
ble with the Trimariner.
In addition to the slow speed and the lack of
cargo flexibility, the Trimariner has the shortcomings common
to all commercial ships in the AE:
(1) inadequate COMM/ELECT capability
(2) inadequate damage-control equipment
(3) inadequate accommodations for crew and members of
the landing force
(4) inadequate handling and unloading of the ship's
6000-ton barges
79
(5) inadequate facilities for helicopter-landing area.
Due to these shortcomings, it is concluded that
the unmodified Trimariner is not suitable for use in the AE.
In order to consider the Trimariner for use in
the AE, improvements related to the handling of landing craft
must be made. Due to its configuration, the Trimariner could
probably embark landing craft as fast as any amphibious ship;
however, capabilities would be needed to protect the wet-well
from salt water to facilitate craft and vehicle maintenance
during transit. A wooden deck overlay or other cushioning
material would have to be installed to prevent damage to the
bottom of the landing craft. A craft tie-down system would
be needed to prevent shifting in heavy seas. In addition,
the following modifications would be needed:
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(1) install CIWS forward and aft along with fire-control
system and magazines
(2) install surface-search radar, signal bridge, central
communication and internal-communication system
(3) install two emergency-diesel generators
(4) install damage-control equipment, pumps and fire-
fighting equipment
(5) install one helicopter platform with operational
and safety equipment
80
(6) install one additional ship-service generator.
The result would be a ship the size of a World War II LSD
that would have the capability of carrying LCAC's and launch-
ing them while underway.
Even with the above modifications, the ship's
speed of 16 kn. and the resulting inability to keep up with
the 20-knot speed of the ATF, eliminate the Trimariner for
consideration in the AE
.
The Trimariner with its wet-well capacity would
be a valuable asset in the AFOE. The non-self-sustaining
containership which will be discussed in more detail in the
next section, does not have the capability to unload containers
without container-handling equipment located at a port facility
The Trimariner has the capability to transport large barge
cranes to the AOA. These cranes could be used to unload
non-self-sustaining containerships, which is a critical prob-
lem when considering the use of merchant ships. The 6000-ton
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barges projected as a normal load for the ship are too
81
large for the warping tugs available in the AOA.
Due to its capability to deliver barge cranes
to the AOA, the Trimariner offers excellent potential for
use in the AFOE. If for no other reason, it is capable of
solving at least part of the container discharge problem
from non-self-sustaining container ship.
A recent development from one of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries can be compared to
the Trimariner. The Baco-Liner 1 (barge container) has been
employed in West Germany. It has the float on/float off
principle of the Trimariner. The vessel takes on barges
through double bow doors. The barges are carried in two
enclosed dock spaces separated by a bulkhead along the ship's
center line. Each dock space is able to take six of the
special Baco barges. These barges are units of 800-ton
capacity or just a little smaller than the Seabee barge.
Alternatively, the Baco 1 can accommodate 14 LASH barges.
On deck containers can be stored and handled by the ship's
one gantry crane. The ship's barge and container handling
could be done without the use of a pier facility. This
total self-sufficient concept gives it an advantage over the
Trimariner, which cannot handle containers without an external
82gantry.
g. Containership
In the assault phase of an amphibious operation,
many of the initial supplies required such as food and
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ammunition are carried in individual packs or in small
breakbulk packages that provide rapid unloading and quick
access. Containerized cargo is not suitable for the AE for
the following reasons:
(1) it requires sophisticated container-handling equip-
ment for ship unloading.
(2) it requires a large volume of lighterage with the
capacity to handle containers weighing several tons; (this
lighterage is not available in the AOA during the assault
phase of an amphibious operation--the lighterage is used
for the ship-to-shore movement of the assault force)
.
(3) it requires a sophisticated unloading facility with
container handling equipment to unload lighters at the beach
(an unloading operation of this type is not feasible during
83the AE of an amphibious operation)
.
Due to the above reasons, it can be concluded that
the use of containerships , either modified or unmodified, is
not feasible. Therefore, there will be no further discussion
of either self-sustaining or non-self-sustaining container-
ship relative to its use in the AE of an amphibious operation,
h. Self-Sustaining Containership in the AFOE
The self-sustaining containerships is a converted
breakbulk ship that has maintained the on-board cranes and/or
u 84 . .Dooms. This gives the self-sustaining containership a
unique advantage for use in AFOE of an amphibious operation.
It has the ability to unload containers into lighters for
ship-to-shore movement; however, there is still the problem
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of getting the containers across the surf zone, unloaded at
the beach and transported inland. This problem will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter IV of this study.
Another problem that merits mentioning, although not con-
sidered major, is the lack of selectivity in cargo offload.
Containers are offloaded in the order that they are stored.
This takes away the flexibility of offloading cargo by the
supply priorities dictated by the tactical situation ashore.
Other advantages of the self-sustaining container-
ship include its large cargo-carrying capacity and its excel-
lent cargo throughput rates. Due to its cargo- carrying
capacity and its loading and unloading capability, it can
be concluded that the self-sustaining containership has tre-
mendous value for the delivery of supplies in the APOE. This
is based on the assumption that the container-handling opera-
tion at the beach can be solved.
It is worthy of note that as of 19 78, 11 of the
18 self-sustaining containerships in the U.S. merchant fleet
85
were over 25 years old. The trend in containership con-
struction is toward the more commercially efficient non-self-
sustaining containership. Therefore, the self-sustained
containership cannot be counted on for use in future strate-
gies. The Mormacdraco pictured in figure III- 27 is a good
example of a self-sustaining containership. The vessel is
86666 ft. long with a deadweight of 16,183 tons.
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i. Non-Self-Sustaining Containership in the AFOE
The non-self-sustaining containership has the
added advantage of being newer and faster than the self-
sustaining ship. Large volumes of cargo can be transported
to the AOA rapidly. Modern containers carry up to 22 tons
of cargo. They are lifted onto the ship, stacked and locked
into place for delivery to its destination. The container
acts as a protective shelter until the cargo is ready for
87
use.
When analyzing the use of the non-self-sustaining
containership for use in the AFOE in an amphibious operation,
an additional problem is seen. The newer non-self-sustaining
containership cannot be offloaded without the use of an
equipment intensive pier facility. Figure 111-28 pictures
the non-self-sustaining containership, Argonaut, which was
88
completed in early 19 79.
D. CONCLUSION
The merchant ship is designed to make point-to-point trips
for the delivery of cargo as economically as possible. The
amphibious ship is designed to deliver the landing force to
the AOA under hostile conditions as expeditiously as possible.
The difference in objectives leads to differences in manning,
design and on-board equipment.
None of the unmodified merchant ships addressed were found




1. inadequacy of accommodations for the expanded crew
and members of the landing force
2. inadequacy of radar, COMM/ELECT equipment
3
.
inadequate damage and fire-control features
4. lack of defensive weapons on board
5. inability to launch landing craft and amphibious
vehicles
6. lack of sufficient lighterage plus associated handling
and safety problems
7. lack of helicopter-landing spaces that allow for the
debarkation of supplies, troops and equipment
8. lack of suitable cargo-handling equipment for landing
force, vehicles, equipment and supplies
With extensive modifications, the 20-knot breakbulk ship
and cargo/passenger ship could be made suitable for employ-
ment in the AE; however, modifications are expensive and
time-consuming. Cost could range from 86 million dollars
on a breakbulk ship to 105 million dollars on a cargo/
passenger ship. In a military contingency, the time and
facilities may not be available to perform extensive modifi-
cations. Further, both of these ship types are nearing obso-
lescence and cannot be depended upon for use by the amphibi-
ous forces of the future.
Even with extensive modifications, the remaining ship
types were not considered suitable for the AE. The reasons




a. cargo configuration, 500-ton barges, not suit-
able for assault
b. inability to perform in surf with more than
eight-foot waves
c. total reliance on single gantry for offloading
2. Seabee ;
a. cargo configuration 1000- ton barges not suit-
able for AE
b. total reliance on stern elevator for offloading
c. elevator's sensitivity to seastate when unloading
d. slow unloading cycle time
3. Ro/Ro Ship




a. ship speed too slow for AE
b. open stern exposes cargo in well to hazard or
damage
With limited personnel and equipment augmentation, all
the ships analyzed are suitable for employment in the AFOE.
However, all ships have varying levels of usefulness. One
of the major problems that surfaced is the difficulty in
unloading ships in the open ocean under hostile conditions.
This problem is particularly acute with the Ro/Ro, Seabee
and containership. The problem of unloading merchant ships
without the benefit of a port facility will be analyzed in
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Chapter IV of this study. Table III- 3 provides a matrix
that summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the




Figure III-l. Amphibious Command Ship (LCC)
,
Blue Ridge Class.







Figure III-2. Amphibious Assault Ship (LHA) , Tarawa Class





Figure III-3. Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA) , Tulare CI








Figure III-4. Amphibious Cargo Ship (LKA) , Charleston
Class





Figure III-5. Amphibious Transport (LPA) , Paul
Revere Class




Figure III-6. Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD)
,
Raleigh and Austin Classes





Figure III- 7. Amphibious Assault Ship (LPH) , Iwo Jima Class
Source: Amphibious Ships, Landing Craft and Vehicles / p. 19
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Figure III- 8. Dock Landing Ship (LSD), Thomaston
and Anchorage Classes
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Figure III-9. Tank Landing Ship (LST) , LST-1179
Newport Class





Figure 111-10. LCAC, JEFF B.




Figure III-ll. Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM)
,
LCM Mark 6





Figure 111-12. Cargo/Passenger Ship, Santa Mercedes Class




Figure 111-13. American Courier Offloading an LCM-8
Source: Report on Results of the Conventional Breakbulk
Ship Pretest of the Joint Logistics-Qver-The-




Figure 111-14. Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel (LVTP7)









Figure 111-15. Floating Causeway




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 111-24. Baltic Eagle

























































































































Figure III- 27. USS Mormacdraco
Source: "The Modern American Merchant Marine," p. 72
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Figure 111-28. Non-Self-Sustaining Containership,
the USS Argonaut





COMPARATIVE MANNING ON A NAVY AMPHIBIOUS CARGO
SHIP (LKA-117) AND A TYPICAL MERCHANT GENERAL
PURPOSE CARGO SHIP (SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER)
FUNCTION DESCRIPTION
EXECUTIVE
Command Command and Executive
Officers















Operate Radar, CIC; Assist 10
in Maneuver








Maintain Electronics Eqpt 5
Postal, Records, Clerical, 2
Admin
DECK/WEAPONS
Maintenance of Ship's 67
External Structure, Rig-


























Maintenance & Repair of 15
Weapons Control Eqpt,
Telemetry and Test Eqpt




Maintain and Repair Ships 26
Propulsion Machinery and
Auxiliary Eqpt
Operate and Maintain Boilers, 20
Pumps, Blowers
Maintain Power and Lighting, 15
Control Eqpt, Switchboards
Operate, Maintain and Repair 15
Diesel Engines
Fabricate, Install and Repair 21
Shipboard Structures, Plumbing
and Piping
Maintain Interior Communica- 6
tions




Maintain Financial Records, 3
Cash
Order, Inspect, Stow and 8
Issue Materials and Cargo




















NOTE 1: There is no precise parallel between the organization
of Navy ship and a merchant ship; therefore the
table allocates people to job description or
function, which is not necessarily identical to
actual Navy department and division.
NOTE 2: Almost all personnel on both a Navy ship and
a merchant ship do more than one job. The
table is based on a typical day of ship's
business and does not take into account




COST ESTIMATES FOR MODIFIED MERCHANT SHIPS
Break- Tri- Cargo
bulk Ro/Ro mariner LASH SEABEE Pass
Executive 11 11 11 11 11 11
Medical 4 4 4 4 4 4




18 19 18 19 19 18
(Electronics) 6 6 6 6 6 6
(Intelligence) 11 11 11 11 11 11
Deck/Weapons
(Cargo handling) 61 29 11 19 11 59
(Boat/Aviation/
Weap)*
31 19 117 79 109 31
(Fire control) 15 15 15 15 15 15
Engineering
(Engineer) 34 26 72 54 70 34
(Boiler) 6 6 6 6 6 6
(Electrical) 25 17 21 16 14 24
(Machinist) 14 14 14 13 13 14
(Hull) 24 29 32 30 31 25
Supply
(Storekeeping) 4 4 9 4 9 4
(Mess) 26 21 34 28 32 26
(Service) 4 5 5 5 5 4
(Disbursing) 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 301 243 393 327 373 299
These numbers include crews for the landing craft. In some cases boat
crews are furnished by an Assault Craft Unit, in which cse they are
not technically ship's crew members, but are carried as embarked
troops. In either case, however, they require living accommodations.
Source: Meraug Study




SUMMARY OF MERCHANT SHIPS SUITABILITY FOR USE
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IV. CARGO DISCHARGE FROM MERCHANT SHIPS
IN AN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In World War II, on the beaches of Normandy and
in the Pacific, it became clear that we could not
build waterfront facilities fast enough to handle
ship- to- shore cargo movements during the early
stages of an invasion. Twenty years later, in
Vietnam, vessels had to wait weeks to discharge
their cargoes via inadequate terminals or by
over-the-beach methods. Months and sometimes
years passed before offloading facilities could
be constructed.
^
In an amphibious operation the United States Navy (USN)/
United States Marine Corps (USMC) team does not have a great
deal of time to offload cargo from assault and follow-on
shipping. The success of the operation depends on the rapid
offloading of troops, supplies and equipment. The elements
of the landing force must be offloaded and moved through the
surf, across the beach and inland as efficiently and effec-
tively as possible.
It has already been determined in this study that a size-
able amphibious task force (ATF) depends on the use of mer-
chant ships in the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE) . Further,
it has been concluded that, with the use of modern day mer-
chant ships in the AFOE, there is a major problem with cargo
unloading in the open sea under hostile conditions. These
commercial carriers are designed to carry large amounts of
139

cargo from point-to-point as economically as possible.
Modern merchant ships, with the possible exception of barge
carriers, rely on sophisticated material handling equipment
(MHE) located at port facilities.
Chapter IV will evaluate the methodology and equipment
available for the discharge of cargo in an amphibious objec-
tive area (AOA) . Specifically, two areas of concern will be
addressed:
1. the offloading of cargo from ships in the open ocean,
and
2. the movement of the cargo over the surf line to the
beach.
B. SHIP OFFLOADING
As already pointed out, since the mid-19 60 *s commercial
shipping has been steadily shifting toward containerships
,
Roll on/Roll off (ro/Ro) ships and barge carriers . It is ^
predicted that by 1985 as much as 85 percent of the United
States (U.S.) flag sealift capacity will be in container-car-
2
rying ships. The vast majority of these ships will be non-
self-sustaining containerships. The offloading of containers
from these ships without a conventional port facility pre-
sents a problem. Figure IV- 1 is an example of the container
handling equipment commonly found at major port facilities.
The present cargo handling equipment in the USN is de-
signed for handling pallets (breakbulk cargo) . The nature




offloading capability. The solution to this problem re-
quires the timely availability of a container offloading
facility in the open ocean of an AOA. Four general concepts
for ship offloading will be examined in the study. They are
the temporary container discharge facility (TCDF) , the crane-




The TCDF is achieved by adding crane (s) of suitable
reach to either a ship or a barge anchored alongside a con-
tainer-carrying vessel. The crane-on-ship method employs a
conventional hull which has been reinforced to allow a crane
to operate on the deck. If the crane can be quickly installed
on selected merchant ships, the result would be a crane-on-
ship TCDF. This TCDF would be capable of mooring alongside
a container-carrying merchant ship and unloading its cargo
*
into the various types of lighterage normally found in the
AFOE. USN studies have shown that the construction of ships
dedicated to serve as container-discharge facilities in time
of war would be very expensive. Then once constructed, there
would be no peacetime application for a ship of this type.
The studies have concluded that the quick installation of
4
cranes for a military contingency is much more cost-effective.
Figure IV- 2 illustrates how this installation would be
accomplished.
*
See glossary of terms.
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The cranes must have a capacity of 30 long- tons at
an outreach of 112 feet (ft.) and a lift capacity of 52
long-tons at 72 ft. from the ship's side. This will allow
containers to be discharged from ships moored alongside
the TCDF directly into lighterage. An added advantage is
that containers can be temporarily stored on the TCDF if
lighterage is not immediately available.
There are many other advantages to the crane-on- ship
TCDF approach:
a. transporting the TCDF is not a problem. The
ship with the crane on board is self-deployable and can
cruise at a reasonable rate of speed.
b. the ship also has some cargo-carrying capacity;
although this capacity is significantly reduced by the cranes
and necessary accessories.
c. the ship would have the capability to be a float-
ing repair shop for landing craft. The cranes would have the
capability to lift these craft out of the water and onto
the deck in order to conduct maintenance.
d. the ship provides a relatively stable platform
for offloading containers in rough seas.
There are disadvantages to the crane-on- ship TCDF
approach. There is a very high cost involved for the cranes
7
and accessory equipment. This equipment would have to be
stored in war reserve stocks and maintained for a military
contingency. Aside from the storage costs, equipment
14 2

obsolescence is a possibility when stored for long periods
of time. Adding to the cost would be the additional crew
(e.g., stevedores, maintenance personnel, etc.) that would
be required to operate the TCDF. Some estimates are as high
9
as 50 additional personnel. There is the problem of dedi-
cating a ship for use as a TCDF. This ship could possibly
be more beneficial if its purpose was to carry cargo.
The crane-on-ship method was used during the offshore
discharge of containerships (OSDOC II) tests conducted by
the United States Army (USA) and USMC. The test took place
from 3 to 14 October 19 72 at Fort Story, Virginia. A USN
1179 class tank landing ship (LST) was used as the crane-
carrying ship. A 250-ton mobile crane was utilized on the
LST-1179 to transfer containers to lighters. Figure IV-3
is a photo of the actual testing in progress. The operational
OSDOC II test of the crane-on-ship TCDF proved to be
4r i 11successful
.
Another form of TCDF is the utilization of a non-
propelled barge as the crane platform. During the OSDOC II
test, an "A" DeLong barge which is a 150 X 80-foot platform
12
was used as a TCDF. The barge proved to be a very stable
platform and the testing was accomplished successfully. The
principal disadvantage of the "A" DeLong barge is that it
13
must be towed into the AOA. The barge is not an ocean-going
vessel and is towed at a very slow rate of speed--four to
five knots (kn.) . In addition to the slow rate of travel,
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barges with large cranes mounted on them are not very sea-
worthy and the equipment incurs prolonged salt-water exposure,
considerable motion stress and inadequate maintenance support
while in tow. Therefore the towing- trans it time and the
equipment's condition upon arrival in the AOA create less
than a desirable readiness situation.
An alternative to the above method is the use of a
"B" DeLong barge. The "B" DeLong barge is a 150 X 60-foot
platform. The advantage in using a "B" DeLong barge is that
it can be carried on a Seabee-barge vessel. This eliminates
the requirement for towing to the AOA. The Seabee is poten-
tially the only ship with the capability of carrying the "B"
DeLong barge equipped with a crane of sufficient capacity.
The barge was successfully lifted clear of the elevator sup-
port pedestals on a Seabee vessel during the Joint Logistics-
Over- the-Shore (LOTS) test conducted from 15 to 18 September
1977 in Hampton Roads, Virginia. Although the barge was not
completely loaded aboard the Seabee vessel, it was concluded




The use of a "B" DeLong-barge TCDF causes three
major problems:
a. The "B" DeLong barge with a crane aboard is very
sensitive to seastate. If sea conditions are other than
calm, use of a "B" DeLong barge as a TCDF is hazardous.
b. A 300- ton crane aboard the "B" DeLong barge in the
LOTS test could only reach the centerline of the
144

non-self-sustaining containership; therefore, the barge
had to be repositioned on the opposite side of the ship
to complete the unloading.
c. There are only three Seabee vessels in the U.S. mer-
chant fleet. Their quick availability in a military con-
tingency cannot be guaranteed.
Figure IV-4 shows a barge TCDF unloading containers
during the LOTS testing.
Several designs for a future TCDF have been presented
by private industry to the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory
(CEL) in Port Hueneme, California. Two proposals are very





One concept submitted by the Eness Corporation and
the J.J. Henry Company provides a unique hull design for the
crane platform. This concept is shown in figure IV-5. The
two hull sections can be joined to form a single hull for
more efficient towing. The gantry- type crane is elevated
19
on four posts that are collapsible for efficiency in towing.
The Battelle/Western Gear Company's concept employs
a ship such as the USN dock landing ship (LSD) . The LSD
would have a movable kingpost and a traveling barge crane
mounted on its deck. The kingpost supports one end of a
225-foot gantry crane and the other end is supported by a
self-moving "A" frame structure resting on the deck of the
20
containership. This concept is pictured in figure IV- 6.
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The mechanical complexity and the requirement for space on
the containership are disadvantages of the system. The con-
cept, however, displays excellent survivability in rough
21
seas.
Both these revolutionary TCDF concepts can remove
8 X 8 X 20-foot containers at a rate of 20 per hour. This
can be accomplished in seastate three which is six-foot waves,
22
eight-foot surf and 30-knot winds. The problem with both
these systems is that they have a single-purpose mission,
that is the unloading of containers from non-self-sustaining
containerships . Further they would be expensive to develop
and purchase. The possibility of peacetime utilization of
23these concepts would make them more cost-effective.
2. COD Method
The COD method is an expeditious way to make a con-
tainership self-sustaining. It involves the addition of a
mobile crane to the deck of a non-self-sustaining container-
ship. The crane can move about the ship and discharge the
entire cargo by using a portable hatchcover bridging kit.
This concept is illustrated in figure IV-7. The LOTS test
proved that a mobile crane on the deck of a non-self-sustain-
ing ship could discharge the cargo of the entire ship in the
24
open ocean. Figure IV- 8 depicts the COD method being
employed in the LOTS test.
The preferred crane as determined by the Naval Coastal
Systems Laboratory (NCSL) , Panama City, Florida, is a 225-ton
25
mobile crane. The general characteristics of this crane
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are depicted in table IV-1. A crane with this capacity
offers two advantages
.
a. By placing the crane on the centerline of the con-
tainership, it can offload containers to either side of
the ship. This eliminates delays incurred while a full
lighter clears the ship and an empty one is being moored.
While lighters are being exchanged on one side, the crane
can shift operations to the other side, where an empty
lighter will have already been placed.
b. A 225-ton crane can work hatches on both sides of the
ship. This reduces the number of moves required in the dis-
charge of the ship's containers. The net improvement on
productivity of this crane as opposed to one of 160-ton
capacity is 35 percent.
In order to spread the weight of the crane to strong
points of the ship, a hatch bridging kit is required. The
kit consists of two beams, placed parallel to the long axis
of the ship. The two beams provide trackage upon which the
crane operates . A second set of beams is individually placed
27in front or behind the crane so it can move forward or aft.
The basic characteristics of the hatch bridging kit are
listed in table IV- 2.
Compared to the barge TCDF, the COD is a more stable
system. However, the COD method will have problems discharging
containers in sea conditions greater than moderate. There
are other disadvantages to the COD approach.
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a. Depending on the location of each ship's superstruc-
ture, three of four cranes could be required per ship.
b. Due to their configuration, there are a number of
non-self-sustaining containerships in the U.S. merchant
fleet that make it impossible for COD operations.
c. Crane availability is a problem. The services would
have to buy or lease a number of the 225-ton cranes. This
number can be quite large when considering that each non-
self-sustaining containership arriving in an AOA would have
its own cranes. Therefore, the concept is an expensive
one.
d. As a result of each non-self-sustaining containership
having cranes on its decks, approximately ten percent of
2 8
the cargo capacity of the ship is lost.
Despite the disadvantages listed, the COD method is
a workable alternative to the container discharge problem.
Implementation is a matter of procuring assets.
It can be concluded that the COD and TCDF ship off-
loading methods are viable solutions to the discharge of
containers from non-self-sustaining containerships. Further,
there are some novel concepts proposed by industry for solving
the container discharge problem. However, shortcomings with
TCDF and COD do exist. These include seastate sensitivity,
cost, mobility to the AOA, single purpose use and reduced
cargo capacity. The requirement exists for more testing and
further development of present methods.
148

3. Ro/Ro Ship Offloading
As pointed out in this study, the Ro/Ro has the
capability of transporting large numbers of heavy vehicles,
including 60-ton tanks, to the AOA. Therefore, it has the
potential of being an optimum support vessel to the Navy and
the Marine Corps in amphibious operations. This potential
cannot be realized unless methods for offloading Ro/Ro ships
in the open ocean are devised. CEL is involved in the devel-
opment of Ro/Ro offloading methods. Three of these methods
(the low seastate ramp, the Ro/Ro lift device and the high
seastate ramp) will be addressed in this section. Two of
the three methods, the low seastate ramp and Ro/Ro lift
device, are expected to be operatinal in fiscal year (FY)
1982.
The emphasis of the unloading- development effort at
CEL is toward the Ponce/Lurline class, the Great Land class
and the Maine class Ro/Ro ships. All of these were addressed
in Chapter III of this study. The Defiance class accounts for
only 4.1 percent of the total Ro/Ro parking space available
in the U.S. merchant fleet and it is primarily operated as
a containership; therefore, it is eliminated from considera-
29tion in this study. Table IV- 3 depicts the U.S. flag Ro/Ro f s
and parking areas. Table IV-4 lists the characteristics
of the three classes of Ro/Ro' s being considered.
In order to evaluate the offloading of vehicles in
the AOA of an amphibious operation, it is necessary to look
at vehicle limitations and types of military vehicles that
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will be carried aboard a commercial Ro/Ro . The vehicle
limitations are summarized in table IV-5. The major limi-
tation when offloading vehicles onto a ramp is the breakover
angle, i.e., the angle formed by the ramp and ship. The
sharpest breakover angle when unloading vehicles from the
ship to a low platform via a ramp is with the side ports
of the Ponce/Lurline and Great Land class Ro/Ro ship. Con-
sideration must be given to vehicles with low breakover-
angle limits when planning loading and unloading of a Ro/Ro
ship.
Maneuverability of the vehicle is also a prime con-
sideration. Ro/Ro ships are designed to carry 40-foot
trailers. Those trailers are unloaded commercially by the
use of a short maneuverable yard tractor. These tractors
are not available in the military inventories, therefore,
maneuverability of vehicles in unloading can be a signifi-
cant problem.
More common vehicles that are contained in the USMC
landing force are 6 X 6- foot, five- ton cargo or dump trucks
with two-wheel trailer, one-quarter-ton jeep with trailer
and five-ton truck tractor with a van or 12-ton high bed
trailer. The van or high bed trailer is expected to present
the most difficulty in unloading because of its relative
lack of maneuverability. The trailer can carry an 8 X 8 X
20-foot container, consequently making it a very critical
item of equipment in the AOA. The five- ton truck tractor
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with 12-ton high bed trailer loaded with an 8 X 8 X 20-foot
container is very similar to a standard truck/semi- trailer
loaded with a commercial container.
Table IV-6 lists the vehicles found in the USMC
landing force that approach the limits set forth in table
IV-5. In a simulated test, conducted by CEL using the
Ponce/Lurline class Ro/Ro, maneuvering problems emerged as
30
the most significant. The turning radius of the vehicles
was a limiting factor in the efficient unloading process.
Cornering the multitude of columns when trying to gain access
to the side ports was the biggest problem. When maneuvering
space is restricted, the skill of the driver will effect the
offloading rate. Also the offloading rate is expected to
degrade as the seastate increases. This is caused by the
motion of the ship and the offloading facility.
Three ofloading concepts being developed by CEL will
be addressed in this section. They are the low seastate ramp,
the Ro/Ro lift device and the high seastate Ro/Ro lift device.
The low seastate ramp is derived from the use of bridge sec-
tions currently being held or forthcoming into the Army's
inventory. Figure IV-9 illustrates this concept. The bridge
section is used as a ramp from the stern or side port of a
Ro/Ro to a floating causeway section. Three of the Army's
basic bridge types are being considered. They are the armored
vehicle launched bridge (M60AVLB) , the Bailey bridge and the
31
medium girder bridge. The low seastate ramp can only be
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used in a very calm, harbor-like sea condition. This is a
severely limiting factor for use in an amphibious environ-
ment. A calm seastate cannot be counted on in an AOA.
In a slightly higher seastate, the Ro/Ro lifting
device presents another alternative. The TCDF already dis-
cussed would be configured with a special Ro/Ro lifting cage
pictured in figure IV-10. The cage would be configured to
allow a Ro/Ro capability. This device would also be very
sensitive to seastate and the unloading rate would be slow.
A third conceptual design approach to offloading
vehicles from a Ro/Ro ship is the high seastate ramp. This
ramp is pictured in figure IV-11. This would involve the
use of a specially designed and manufactured ramp leading to
a causeway section. This alternative would require higher
development and manufacturing costs than the other alterna-
32tives. The causeway section could be self-propelled allow-
ing movement from ship-to-shore with the vehicles aboard.
The self-propelled causeway will be discussed in detail in
the ship-to-shore section of this chapter. The high seastate
ramp can be used in seastate 3 but the low seastate ramp is
limited to use in a seastate 1 and the Ro/Ro lift device is
33limited to use in seastate 2.
It can be concluded that although none of the above
described systems are functioning, they do offer some viable
solutions to the Ro/Ro problem in the not-so-distant future.
Their major shortcoming is their sensitivity to seastate.
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4 . Airborne-Unloading Systems
The TCDF and COD methods of container unloading from
ships depend on lighterage for the ship-to-shore movement of
containers. A big advantage of the airborne system of ship
unloading is that containers can be unloaded from the ship
and moved directly to the beach or for that matter further
inland to the user.
A number of airborne systems have been developed for
container offloading in the AOA. Under consideration for
airborne delivery of containers are the balloon-transport
system, the aerocrane , the helistat and the helicopter.
a. Balloon-Transport System
In World War I, numerous bombing, observation
and supply missions were accomplished by using balloon tech-
nology. The airship was used extensively in World War II
in an anti-submarine role. Following World War II, there
were 168 airships in the inventory; however, they gradually
became obsolete as a tactical vehicle. In 1961, the remain-
34ing fleet of airships were decommissioned.
In recent years, studies have been done to explore
the possible use of lighter-than-air vehicles in logistical
operations. Of particular interest to this study have been
the efforts to employ these vehicles to move heavy cargo
such as containers.
The lighter-than-air balloon has been in use for many
years in the Oregon logging industry. The balloon system
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has allowed timber to be removed from remote logging sites
without having to build expensive road networks. Due to
the balloon's heavy lift capability and its success in the
logging industry, the USA and USN designed a series of tests
to determine if the balloon concept could be applied to
military logistics. Of particular interest was the possi-
bility of using balloons to transfer containers from ship-
to-shore and to transfer containers from ship-to- lighter
.
The balloon-transfer test was conducted at Fort Story , Virginia,
in March of 19 77. An LST 1180 was used to simulate a
containership
.
In the ship-to-shore unloading, pictured in
figure IV-12, it was concluded that the balloon system
was technically feasible; however, operational problems
were encountered:
*
(1) the load pendulation made container handling
difficult and hazardous on the deck of the ship.
(2) the unloading operation was very sensi-
36
tive to wind conditions.
In ship-to-lighter unloading, testing proved
this method less promising. In addition to wind sensitivity
and pendulation problems, mooring the ship within the toler-
ance required by the balloon system and lighters proved to
be difficult and time-consuming.
*
See glossary of terms.
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Despite the problems, the test group concluded
that the concept had promise and efforts to overcome the
problems should be pursued. However, at this time there
has been no further action taken. CEL engineers are pessi-
mistic about the future of this concept, primarily because
37
of its sensitivity to wind.
b. Helistat and Aerocrane, Advanced Concepts
The helistat (quadrotor) is a buoyant air vehi-
cle which employs four large helicopters rigidly attached
to an interconnecting structure. This concept is shown in
figure IV-13. The controls on the helicopters are inter-
connected. A helium- filled envelope attached to the inter-
connecting structure provides buoyance to the entire assembly.
This concept gives the helicopter ten times its normal load
38
capacity. The interconnected control systems respond to
one set of controls in the aft port helicopter which is
designed as the master control station. The payload is
carried externally, slung below the vehicle on four cables.
The aerocrane (roto balloon) is an air vehicle
which combines the aerostate-lift force of the balloon with
the aerodynamic-lift force of a helicopter. This concept is
illustrated in figure IV-14 and figure IV-15. The aerocrane
weighs 50 tons and has four 112 X 18- foot wings. Each wing
would have a 200-horsepower, turboprop engine mounted to
39it. The low pressure sphere provides an aerostatic lift
equal to all of the vehicle's structural weight. The four
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wings provide the remaining ship-load lift and the force
required for vehicle movement at ten revolutions per minute.
In flight, the balloon and wings rotate as the vehicle moves
through the air. The control cab underneath is powered and
geared to rotate at the same speed and in the opposite
rotation to the aircraft structure; therefore, the cab main-
tains a still position relative to the buoyant air vehicle.
The helistat and the aerocrane are concepts that
were developed by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)
.
The development was motivated by the need to lift the heavy
standardized containers that will be found in the amphibious
environment of the future. The aerocrane and helistat are
considered high risk-development projects. They have poten-
tial for meeting short haul, heavy lift, operational require-
ments. Considerably more testing is required before a
judgment can be made as to their ultimate feasibility and
utility. Cost and transportability are serious considera-
tions bearing on these two advance development projects.
In the final analysis, sensitivity to wind conditions will
probably be the eliminating factor since inflating the air
system cannot be accomplished in wind conditions higher
40than eight kn.
c. Helicopter Unloading System
There are a number of advantages to using a




(1) it eliminates the need for watercraft and
heavy lift capability on the beach.
(2) it can be used to deliver containers
directly from the ship to the logistic support area (LSA)
.
(3) the tactical situation permitting, it can
be used to deliver containers further inland to the user
(this would be ideal in the case of containerized ammunition)
41
(4) it is insensitive to sea conditions.
Container offloading by helicopter is pictured in figure
IV-16.
There has been considerable testing using USMC
CH-53 and CH-47 helicopters. The CH-53 can be modified to
handle a 16-ton container and the CH-47 can be modified to
42handle 12 tons. The standard 8 X 8 X 20-foot container,
fully loaded, weighs approximately 22 tons; therefore, any
container requiring helicopter lift would have to be weight
limited. Further, the hatch covers on non-self-sustaining
containerships which weigh 25 to 35 tons would have to be
43
removed by some external source such as a TCDF or COD.
The primary use of the USMC helicopter is combat
support. Assigning helicopters for logistical unloading of
containers while there is a tactical situation ashore is
unlikely unless there is a significant increase in the num-
ber of helicopters normally assigned to a Marine amphibious
force (MAF) . Considering the high cost of helicopters and
today's fiscal constraints, this is unlikely.
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The USA was developing a heavy lift helicopter
(HLH) that was to be used for the discharge of 8 X 8 X 20- foot
containers from containerships . The HLH would have had a
44
23. 5- ton lift capacity. However, the development effort
was stopped due to high research and development costs and
the high estimated unit costs. The HLH would also have had
a problem with the heavy hatch covers
.
It can be concluded that the USMC CH-53 pictured
in figure IV- 16 can be very useful in unloading high-priority,
weight-limited, deck-stowed containers; however, helicopter
availability in a tactical situation is expected to be
limited.
C. SHIP-TO-SHORE MOVEMENT OF CARGO
Thus far in Chapter IV various methods of offloading non-
self-sustaining containerships and Ro/Ro ships have been
examined. In the case of airborne systems, the cargo can
be delivered directly to the beach or even further inland;
however, when unloading is accomplished by the TCDF, COD
and Ro/Ro methods, the cargo must still be transported through
the surf to the beach before being unloaded. Generally, this
involves the use of lighters. In the case of a heavy 22-ton
container, this is no easy task when obstacles such as heavy
surf, bad weather and soft sand are possible. This section
of Chapter IV will address methods of solving the ship-to-




The elevated causeway system developed by CEL has
potential for solving the ship-to-shore offloading problem
for containers and rolling stock transported on commercial
ships.
The elevated causeway system is designed to provide
an interface between the lighterage and beach by bridging
45
the surf zone. The elevated access terminates at the
offshore end in a pierhead that supports the cargo unloading
function. Figure IV- 17 illustrates the pierhead arrange-
ment. The system is based on a 3 X 15-foot pontoon section,
46
21 ft. wide by 9 ft. long. The pontoon sections make
up the floating causeway which is part of the equipment main-
tained by the USN amphibious construction battalion. The
major elements of the system are an elevating capability for
the existing floating causeway, a crane installed at the
pierhead of offloading lighters, a fendering system allowing
the mooring of lighters to the pierhead for offloading, a
turnaround component to redirect truck traffic on the cause-
way (within a limited area) and a two-way traffic access
from the pierhead to the beach,
a. Elevating Capability
The elevating system consists of five hydraulic
47
chain jacks and accessory equipment. Once elevated, the
causeway is supported by 20-inch piles. The elevating sys-
tem can be packaged in an 8 X 8 X 20- foot container. Figure





In tests conducted on the elevated causeway,
a 90-ton, truck-mounted, rubber-tired crane was used. The
crane is pictured in figure IV- 19. The function of the
crane is to offload containers from lighters moored along-
side the pierhead and place them on the back of semi-trailers
The crane is adapted with a container-handling spreader such
as the one pictured in figure IV-20.
c. Fender System
A system consisting of plastic fenders is used
to cushion the lighterage during the loading and unloading
process. The cushions are four ft. in diameter and 7.4 ft.
48in length. Figure IV- 21 shows the system in the process
of being installed.
d. Turnaround System
A turntable is utilized to rotate trucks and
trailers at the pierhead area. The turntable rotates on
eight 34-inch in diameter air bearings, is 4 8 ft. long and
has a total weight of 30,000 pounts ( lb
.
) . Figure IV- 2
2
shows a USMC M52 truck with an M127 trailer (M52/M127)
being rotated on the turntable. This system eliminates the
necessity to build a large pierhead in order to have suffi-
cient area for trucks to turnaround. The USMC M52/M127
*
Two tests in constructing and utilizing the elevated
causeway have been accomplished: one at Point Magu, Ca.,




would require an area equivalent to eight causeway sections
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in order to turn around at the pierhead area. This vehicle
can be used to carry the standard 8 X 8 X 20-foot container.
e. Two-Way Traffic
The elevated roadway from the beach to the pier-
head allows two-way traffic. The roadway meets the specifi-
cations of an H20 highway, i.e., a 32,000 pound axle load
and 75-pound per square inch (psi) wheel pressure. Two-
way traffic on the causeway is pictured in figure IV-23.
f. Performance Goals
The elevated causeway was designed and developed
to meet or exceed the following requirements:
(1) compatible with lighterage for offloading
existing containerships and other container-capable ships
such as Ro/Ro ships, bargeships and other cargo ships
(2) transportable by amphibious force ships and
commercial shipping
(3) provide for lighterage operation/cargo
handling and unloading beyond the surf zone
(4) capable of being elevated from the floating
mode with an installation time of 72 working hours for a
12-section pier
(5) capable of handling 20-foot (22-ton) con-




(6) capable of being elevated 15 ft. above mean
low water (to account for 8-foot tide) , in water depths of
ten to 20 ft. at the pierhead
(7) capable of providing for a transfer rate
of ten to 20 containers per hour from lighterage to shore
(assuming sufficient lighterage)
(8) capable of operating continuously for a
period of six to 12 months, after which time it can be incor-
porated into a larger installation, relocated, or retrieved
and stored.
It was concluded, based on two tests conducted
thus far, that the elevated causeway can be used for trans-
ferring 8 X 8 X 20- foot containers weighing up to 22 tons
to the beach. However, CEL has several recommendations rela-
tive to the equipment and installation techniques that would
. . . 52
significantly improve the system. It is the opinion of CEL
engineers that if these recommendations are implemented, the
53
elevated causeway can meet the performance goals listed.
2 . Self-Powered Causeway System
CEL is developing a self-powered causeway section.
The concept involves a standard 3 X 15-foot causeway with a
self-contained propulsion capability. The powered causeway
is made up of two subsections: a non-powered subsection and
a waterjet propulsion plant.
The self-powered causeway system was designed to meet
the following major operational requirements:
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a. deployment by LST side-carry, relieving
valuable LSD wet-well space
b. self-sustaining powered causeway ferry
operations
c. minimum degradation in thrust and maneuvera-
bility when operating in surf zone and in debris-infested
54
waters.
The self-propelled causeway can perform three functions
In the first, as a powered causeway ferry, it acts as a vehi-
cle for transporting cargo from a ship to an unloading station
such as the elevated pierhead. This function is pictured in
figure IV-24. Second, as a self-propelled causeway, vehicles
can be unloaded from a Ro/Ro ship onto the causeway. The
causeway can then be powered into the beach where the vehi-
cles can be offloaded. This function is pictured in figure
IV-25. Third, as a warping tug, it simulates a barge capable
of carrying cargo. This function is pictured in figure IV-26.
Prototype testing of the self-propelled causeway
section in 19 77 proved that it could be a very valuable piece
of equipment when used to solve the movement of containers
and vehicles from commercial shipping to the shore in the
AFOE of an amphibious landing. Figure IV-27 depicts the
operational characteristics of the powered causeway section.
3. Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) Vehicles
The LCAC vehicle, JEFF B, discussed in Chapter III,
has great potential for use in the ship-to-shore movement
of containers. An LCAC vehicle has the capability to "fly"
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through the water at speeds up to 50 kn. It can go over the
surf line and onto the beach. While on the beach, it can
proceed at a reduced rate of speed, approximately five miles
per hour (mph) , to an unloading circle. The LCAC can maneu-
ver into position, drop from the air cushion, and lower its
two ramps. Container handling equipment can then commence
unloading. The characteristics of the JEFF B are shown
in figure IV-28.
Table IV- 7 shows the maximum number of containers
transportable by the JEFF B.
Table IV- 8 is provided to give the dimensi
weight of each container listed. The computation assumes
a single tier container. The 8 X 8 X 20-foot containers and
larger ones will impose high concentrated loads on landing
craft decks, since all the load is transferred through the
four end fittings (points) . For an 8 X 8 X 20- foot container,
the maximum point load is 11,200 lb. or 456 psi. The corres-
ponding load for the 8 X 8 X 40-foot container is 16,800 lb.
or 628 psi. Large base plates would have to be utilized
on the decks of the craft to distribute the high corner
54loads over a greater area.
Cargo damage while at sea due to the container being
only partially loaded has been reported. This problem would
be aggravated in ship-to-shore movement in a LCAC vehicle;
consequently, greater attention to internal packing would
be required and possibly special tie-down fittings could
55be used in the LCAC vehicle.
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Since the LCAC vehicle is not scheduled to enter
the Navy until 19 85 , its usefulness in container transport
58
for ship-to-shore movement is speculative at this point.
Further, use of the LCAC highlights another problem, i.e.,
the offloading of containers from a landing craft on the
beach. As already pointed out, commercial containers are
normally offloaded by sophisticated equipment at the pier
facilities. Currently, there is no MHE in the USMC ' s inven-
tory that can satisfactorily unload a container weighing in
excess of 20 tons from a landing craft on a sandy beach.
4 . Light Amphibious Container Handler (LACH)
A solution to the problem of container unloading
could be with the LACH. The LACH is pictured being uti-
lized in beach operation in figure IV-29 . The responsi-
bility for developing the LACH lies with the USMC. This
experimental vehicle is designed to remove fully-loaded con-
tainers from landing craft that have been beached. Its lift
59
capacity is 50,000 lb. The LACH can be pushed or towed
by a bulldozer with the blade removed. In the LOTS test
conducted in 1977, the LACH prototype performed well in its
designed mission to straddle a standard 8 X 8 X 20-foot con-
tainer and lift it well off the surface. It can straddle
any standard truck bed up to eight ft. wide and lower the
container onto the truck.
Some of the characteristics that make the LACH a
good candidate for use in an amphibious environment are:
165

a. it extends the usefulness of conventional land-
ing craft by bridging the shoreline gap caused by receding
tides on a shallow-slope beach.
b. it has large- wheels (approximately eight ft.
in diameter) which allow it to traverse shallow shoreline
water in retrieving cargo.
c. it is compatible with all landing craft currently
in the Navy's inventory.
d. it could be modified to pick up breakbulk cargo
as well as containers with only a small development effort.
e. it is relatively easy to maintain. Electrical
and hydraulic systems are self-contained and comparatively
easy to perform both preventive and corrective maintenance.
f. its weight is only 40,000 lb
.
, making it easy
to transport. Its lift capacity is more than its own
weight.
g. its cost, $50,000, is relatively cheap when
considering the function that it performs.
Two distinct disadvantages that are characteristic
of the LACH are:
a. its reliance on a prime mover such as bulldozer
which may not always be available
b. its slow cycle time (it can unload four con-
tainers per hour from a lighter at the shoreline and place
6 2
them on a truck for transportation inland)
.
With the projected use of the LCAC vehicles in 1985,
the LACH provides tremendous potential for container unloading
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on the beach. This would be a major development in the
efficient and effective ship-to-shore movement of standard
8 X 8 X 20- foot containers.
D. CONCLUSION
If the U.S. had to conduct an amphibious operation today,
requiring the use of non-self-sustaining containerships and
containerized cargo, there would be no way to unload and
move cargo ashore. The same can be said for Ro/Ro ships
with their cargo of combat vehicles.
It can be concluded from the contents of this chapter
that many innovative concepts that offer solutions to
various stages of the cargo discharge problem are available.
Some of these concepts have been completely developed and
others are nearing completion; however, none of them have
been fully implemented as of this date. The equipment re-
quired has not made its way into the inventories of the
appropriate military services. Primarily, this is due to
fiscal constraints: not only the lack of money to purchase
equipment, but also lack of funding to speed development
6 *3
efforts. Table IV-9 depicts the completion or estimated
completion dates of the development of the discharge concepts
discussed.
All of the concepts have certain advantages and disadvan-
tages. These are summarized in tables IV-10, IV-11 and IV-12
Based on recent information, the lighter-than-air concepts
(balloons, helistat and aerocrane) have been eliminated from
167

further development at this time. This is due to their
extreme sensitivity to wind conditions.
Although some methods have more advantages than others
,
the intent is not to prove one method better than another.
Advantages and disadvantages are weighed differently.
Further, it might take a complement of most of the methods
available to conduct ship offloading and cargo movement to
shore in a major amphibious operation. Availability of
various types of shipping, cranes, landing craft, helicopters,
beach unloading devices and other equipment will dictate
the types of methods used.
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Figure IV-3. USN 1179 Class LST Serving as TCDF
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Figure IV- 5. Eness Corporation and J.J. Henry
Company Concept
Source: Project ELF, Expeditionary Logistics
Facility for Containerships , Barge





Figure IV- 6. Battelle/Western Gear Company's Concept
Source: Project ELF, Expeditionary Logistics Facility
for Containerships , Barge Ships and Other





















































Figure IV- 8. COD Method Being Employed in LOTS Test










































































































































































































TOTAL INSTALLED PGWefl, 7&GG TOTAL K?
180 FOOT DIAMETER
WING WIDTH. 21 FEET
8.6 RPM. TIP SPEED 2147SEC
47MPH
90 TON SLING LOAD
Figure IV-15. Aerocrane
Source: Graeter, p. 54.
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Figure IV-16. Helicopter Container Offloading
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Figure IV-18. Causeway Elevation in Process
Source: Integrated Logistic Support Plan for Elevated
Causeway System of the Container Offloading




Figure IV-19. P & H Model 80-1000, 90-Ton Truck Crane
Source: (COTS) Offloading and Transfer System,
Vol. II, p. 19
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Figure IV- 20. Manual Spreader Bar






Figure IV- 21. Installation of Fender System
Source: Integrated Logistics Support Plan for Elevated
Causeway System of the Container Offloading





Figure IV- 22. Turntable Rotating M52 Tractor with
M127 Trailer
Source: Integrated Logistic Support Plan for Elevated
Causeway System of the Container Offloading
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Figure IV-23. Elevated Causeway Allows Two-Way Traffic
Source: Integrated Logistic Support Plan for ElevatedCauseway System of the Container Offloading
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Figure IV-24. Powered Causeway Ferry-
Source: Self-Powered Causeway System, p. 1
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Figure IV-25. Self-Propelled Causeway




Figure IV-26. Side-Loadable Warping Tug
Source: Self-Powered Causeway System, p. 3
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OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS ... POWERED CAUSEWAY SECTION
LST side-loading and launching
Designed ro tM readily side-loaded and
operational within 15 minutes after
launching. This capability relieves war
wall ioeca for other usage.
STEERABLE NOZZLE.
10RPM
Operating waignt: 1 79.600 pounds
Total hoisting waignt: 1 75.500 pounds
Length - 90 ft: Width - 21 ft: Height - 5 ft.
Static Thrust: Forward 12,000 pounds
Astern 3.000 pounds
Engine: Two GMC8V71T1 HP 425 leachl
Speed: 3.5 knots
Fual tank: 600 gal.
ENGINE MODULE (aachl waignt: 24.600 oounds length: 24ft-11 In. width: 7 ft
CENTER MODULE .... waignt: 20.350 pounds length: 24 ft- 1 1 in. width: 7 ft
CONTROL STATION . . weight: 560 oounds. 40 in. x 40 in. x 54.5 in. nigh
Figure IV- 27.











DRAFT, OFF-CUSHION (design weight)
AREA, CARGO DECK
80 ft in.
87 ft 7 in.
43 ft in.
47 ft in.




3 ft 4 in.
1,740 sq ft
Figure IV-2 8. Amphibious Assault Landing Craft (JEFF B)
Source: Systems Analysis of Amphibious Assault Landing




































































General Characteristics of a Typical 225-Ton Capacity Crane
Basic Machine Weight (incl. 135,000 lb counter weights) 360,270 lb
Length (without boom base) 38 ft 11 in.
Length (with boom base) 73 ft 11 in.
Width (for transportation) 18 ft 7 in.
Width (for operations - traces extended) 21 ft 1 in.
Tailswing (for operations) 24 ft 7 in.
Height (for operations, boom not included) 30 ft 4 in.
Height (for transportation) 14 ft 10 in.
Lifting capacities (with 90- ft boom) at:
25 ft 229,980 lb
60 ft 66,840 lb
90 ft 38,650 lb
Source: Main Test Design of the Joint Logistics-Over-






Characteristics of a Hatch Bridging Kit
Length 43 ft
Width 4 ft 2 1/4 in
Height 3 ft
Weight (each beam) 36,000 lb
Source: Main Test Design of the Joint Logistics-Over-
the-Shore (LOTS) Test and Evaluation











No. Parking Area Total Area for Percentage
A1LABLE (ft1) Class (ft 1 ) of Total
6 150.000 900.000 36.9
4 210.000 840.000 34.4
4 150.000 000.000 24.6
4 25,000 100.000 4.1






COMMERCIAL U.S. RO/RO SHIP CHARACTERISTICS














Stern Ports (H x W)







45.000 34.000 50.000 (est.)
N/A* In super 15ft Under ISft
structure tunnels spar deck
3ft-2in. to 10ft ISft 15ft
18ft ISfi ISft




16ft x 40ft N/A 16ft x 1 6ft (2)
15ft x 14ft (port) Starboard Side
lSft-3in. x 24ft fwd.
15ft- Jin. x 24ft (2 shipn"|
I5ft-3in. x 24ft
10ft t 24ft (stbd) Vmidship iSft-Jin. x 24ft
lift x 24ft 14 ships) J
ISftOin. x 21ft aft ISftOin. x 21lt
NOTES: a = Not Applicable IN/A)
b = 4 ships of this Class have automobile storage on ihe lower decks. Height of these decks is approximately 711.
Where Auto Decks are not installed, the height is generally ISft.















Weight Total 60 tons
Wheel Pressure 90 psi
Ramp Breakover Angle 15 degrees+
Limit Set By













NOTE: *NDF refers to the National Defense Feature Program where-
by the U.S. Government funds the installation of ship design
features that exceed commercial needs but that are useful
in a national emergency.






COMMON VEHICLES WHICH APPROACH
LIMITING CHARACTERISTICS
Characteristics Vehicle
Height 12 Ton Van Trailer, ISOin.
Crane Hydraulic Boom, 160in.
Crane Truck, 157in.
Width Tractor Crawler, 155in.
Length 5 Ton 6x6 Truck Tractor
w/12 Ton Stake Trailer, 520in.
5 Ton 6x6 Truck Tractor
w/5.000 gal. Fuel Tanker, 558in
5 Ton 6x6 Truck Tractor
w/low bed Trailer, 592in.
Weight M60 Tank. 57.2 Tons
Wheel Pressure Jeep, 90 psi
Ramp Breakover Angle Low Bed Trailer, 14.5°














Payload (lb. X 1000)
Half CCNEX 150 15 148.5
CCNEX 150 14 147.0
TRICON 150 10 149.3
MUST 150 16 112.0
10-foot Van 150 6 134.4
20-foot Van 150 3 134.4
30-foot Van 150 2 112.0
35-foot Van 150 2 100.8
40-foot Van 150 2 134.4

















Half CONEX 6-3 6-11 4-3 9,900
CONEX 6-3 6-11 8-6 10.500
TRICON 8-0 8-0 6-8 14,933
MUST 7-6 8-0 12-0 7,000
10-ft Van 8-0 8-0 9-9.75 22.400
20-ft Van 8-0 8-0 19-10.5 44,800
24-ft Van 8-6.5 8-0 24-0 50,000
30-ft Van 8-0 8-0 29-11.25 56,000
35-ft Van 8-6 8-0 35-0 50.400
40-ft Van 8-0 8-0 40-0 67,200













Ro/Ro Low Seastate Ramp











Powered Causeway Section +






No Plan for Development















































































Sensitive to seastate 1
Sensitive to seastate 2 +
























































V. CONTAINER-ORIENTED LOGISTICS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
On the approval of President Nixon, a Joint Logistics
review board was established on March 1, 1969. The purpose
of the review board was to determine the strengths and weak-
nesses of logistic support during the Vietnam era. The
board analyzed the logistics operations of the military ser-
vices. It recommended establishing a Department of Defense
(DOD) containter-oriented logistics system. The board's
recommendations were based on the economic benefits of con-
2tainerization and the trend toward containerships
.
A DOD project to develop a container distribution system
was initiated in 1971. The United States Army (USA) was
designated the executive service for the surface container-
oriented logistics system and the United States Air Force
(USAF) for the air system. A Logistics Systems Policy Com-
mittee assisted by a Joint Container Steering Group was
3
established to coordinate the containerization effort.
Since 9 8 percent of DOD's cargo resources are moved by
4
surface transportation, the USA had the biggest job. A
master plan was developed and today, some ten years later,
critical elements of the system are still lacking. The




The Government Accounting Office (GAO) study states that
the following general reasons for the lack of an adequate
container-oriented logistics system:
1. the complexity of a container distribution system
requires intensive management (DOD has never applied such
management to this program)
.
2. the executive service approach creates difficulty
in making policy decisions, resolving interservice disputes
and monitoring and coordinating the development effort.
3. a lack of funding has hindered timely system
development.
4. the steering group has not provided the timely guidance
for attaining satisfactory progress in achieving a container-
oriented distribution system. Disagreement from members of
the various services creates the biggest problem.
5. there has been a lack of a comprehensive system concept
description and delineation of developmental responsibilities
to each DOD activity to ensure standard equipment, policies
and procedures
.
6. there is no method for ensuring that the services
follow the developmental tasks in the master plan.
Since this study is primarily concerned with amphibious
operations, this final analysis will be dedicated to review-
ing the United States Marine Corps (USMC) program that is
being developed with a view toward the container-oriented
logistics system. Specifically, the Marine Corps Container
System (MCCS) will be described and evaluated. Prior to
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analyzing this system, a general background of containeri-
zation will be presented.
B. BACKGROUND
Containerization involves shipping cargo in truck-like
bodies (containers) that can be detached from the chassis of
a truck by specialized material handling equipment (MHE)
.
Containers can be loaded into specially constructed ships
for ocean transport, loaded onto rail flatcars, or attached
to a prepositioned chassis and trucked inland.
Containerization in the commercial transportation indus-
try has many advantages over conventional (breakbulk)
transportation:
1. time in transit is greatly reduced (ships can be loaded
and unloaded within 24 hours)
.
2. less damage occurs in properly loaded containers.
3. containers can be loaded and sealed by shippers either \y
at a port or some inland point and remain unopened until they
reach overseas consignees.
Containers are generally constructed so that they have
rigid steel frames as a primary structure covered by thin,
light skins of steel, aluminum, fiberglass, or, in some cases,
wood or cardboard. Corner posts with interlocking devices
allow stacking in a variety of ways. Flooring materials are
recoverable and reusable.
As pointed out previously, the container has brought
revolutionary changes to the shipping industry. The older
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and nearly obsolete breakbulk ships had flexibility in the
types of cargo that could be carried. However, they were
characterized by labor-intensive loading and unloading
methods. The newer containership is larger, faster and
designed specifically for carrying large commercial containers,
Its loading and unloading depends upon an equipment-intensive
port facility.
The revolution toward containerization has not been with-
out problems. At the onset, each company produced its own
unique sized and shaped container based on its own needs and
requirements. This caused compatibility problems with con-
tainer handling equipment, trucking and shipping configura-
tions. The American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
and the International Organization for Standardization (IOS)
have made significant contributions toward solving the con-
9tainer standardization problem. The most predominant sizes
are the 8 X 8 X 20-foot and the 8 X 8 X 40-foot containers.
These sizes are now the basis for design of container-oriented
transportation and handling equipment.
There are exceptions to the standardization effort. The
Matson Company and Sealand Inc. built containers prior to
the guidelines set forth by the ANSI and IOS. The Matson
Company designed an 8 X 8 X 24-foot container and Sealand
Inc. uses an 8 X 8 X 35-foot container. The latter two sizes
were once required by highway regulations. Matson' s and
Sealand Inc. 's investments in the containers were so substan-
tial that scrapping them was never a consideration.
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The container standardization program has a big impact
on the military. Containers designed for military use must
be designed to be compatible with the commercial and military
transportation systems. Further, MHE brought into the mili-
tary inventory must be capable of handling ANSI/IOS stand-
ardized containers. In amphibious operations of the future,
an effectively functioning container-oriented logistics system
is essential. This system must be completely integrated




In response to the requirement to have a container-
oriented logistics system, the USMC is developing the MCCS.
The family of containers included within this system will
have the capability to be employed in garrison, afloat or
amphibious operations. Four basic container sizes for general
cargo are needed. They are as follows:
a. a large container required to provide maximum cargo
throughput capability. This container will be used primarily
in the assault- follow-on echelon (AFOE) and in a warehousing
capacity once ashore. This container is designed to be carried
by commercial containerships.
b. an intermediate-size container, compatible with storage
and cargo-handling configurations of both United States Navy
(USN) amphibious ships and commercial ships. This container
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will be used primarily to unitize bulk supplies and support
storage and movement supplies for organizational property.
It could be used in the assault echelon (AE) and the AFOE.
c. a pallet-size container for ease in handling and storage
This container would store individual unit property. It
could be offloaded from USN or commercial ships and could
be utilized in both the AE and AFOE.
d. a mount-out-size container which can be used as a




In addition to the container types listed above,
there is a requirement for a flatrack container to transport
large, irregularly-shaped items, such as bridging and shelter-
system components.
2 . Current System
The current system of transporting supplies to the
amphibious objective area (AOA) is based on locally assembled
wooden boxes (mount-out boxes) , box pallets and flat pallets.
This system is behind modern state-of-the-art methods of
packing, handling and moving cargo. The present wooden
mount-out boxes and pallets provide a limited degree of cargo
unitization, but are still in the breakbulk category. The
amount of cargo that can be put into a mount-out box or on
a pallet is considerably less than the amount that can be
loaded into an 8 X 8 X 20-foot or an 8 X 8 X 4 0-foot container
The current box/pallet-oriented logistics system does not
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permit adaptability to containerships and other merchant
vessels configured for containerized rather than breakbulk
cargo.
The specific operational deficiencies of the current
box/pallet logistics system are listed below:
a. they do not provide the required compatibility with
modern cargo transports.
b. mount-out boxes require assembly by the using military
unit.
c. they have limited cargo capcity when compared to
modern commercial containers
.
d. they require significantly more handling time over a
containerized system.
e. handling is more labor-intensive than a containerized
system.
f. they are of poor construction and consequently have a
short service life.
g. they are not weatherproof without expenditure of
additional resources.
h. they provide limited protection to contents, making
damaged cargo a serious problem.
i. they require cargo to be banded with heavy steel wire
13
necessitating the need for banding and rebanding.
3 . Containers in an Amphibious Environment
The purpose for employing containers in an amphibious
environment in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) is to provide a
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means of cargo unitization to facilitate an increase in
cargo handling and transportation efficiency, and to improve
the protection of supplies during transportation and storage.
The containers must be capable of safe and efficient use in
all areas of the world, on all types of terrain and in vary-
ing climatic conditions.
The current MCCS concept will allow all USMC FMF
units to have a specific number of containers authorized
by their respective table of equipment (T/E) . The containers
will be utilized in garrison to store organizational property
and consumer supplies in a state of mount-out readiness. In
day to day operations, they will serve as storage cabinets in
unit warehouses, which will contribute to more organized and
efficient warehousing operations. A containerized warehousing
system will permit rapid movement of an entire unit supply
warehouse to a field location. Upon arrival, the unit
supply section will be able to commence immediate operation.
Aboard ship, the containers can be used to facilitate
normal supply operations. For example, maintenance repair
parts can be issued right from the containers, allowing both
corrective and preventive maintenance to be performed on
equipment while enroute to the AOA.
During the conduct of an amphibious operation, the
containers will be unloaded and moved ashore during the AE
and AFOE. Once ashore they will serve as field warehouses
in the logistics support area (LSA) , or in each individual
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unit's support area. Containers will serve as the source of
supply for immediate material consumption requirements or
for organizational supplies. Table V-l lists the USMC classes
of supply that are transported to the AOA. The percentage
of these supplies that are containerizable are included.
Under the MCCS concept, containers will require a
minimum of maintenance support. All maintenance will be
performed at the using unit level. Organizations will ship
containers back to designated maintenance units for refurbish-
ment on a programmed basis.
4 . Essential Characteristics of Containers for
Amphibious Operations
As mentioned previously, the containers of the MCCS
will consist of a pallet-size container, an intermediate-
size container, a large-size container, a small mount-out
container and flatracks. All containers must be compatible
with commercial shipboard handling and stowage. Material
selected for the containers will incorporate the latest
technology in corrosion control. A description of each
type of container planned for the MCCS will follow.
a. Pallet-Size Container (PALCON)
The pallet-size container will be essentially
a weather-proof box called a PALCON. Each dimension of the
PALCON will be four feet (ft.) and it will have a four-way
forklift capability. It will have fittings suitable for
attaching slings for helicopter or crane lift. The PALCON
will also have hardware for latching the containers into arrays
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up to 20 ft. long. This will give it compatibility with
containerships. The PALCON will be strong enough to hold
14
a load of approximately 1,400 lb. Doors in the front of
the container will provide access and each container will
have an optional bin insert capability. This will allow for
the storage and transportation of smaller items. A rack can
be installed in the PALCON that can guide and support up to
six insert trays. The PALCON can be effectively handled,
J
c
transported and utilized both afloat and ashore. The
PALCON is small and transportable enough to be part of the
ground combat elements. It can be employed in the same unit
warehouses in which the current 4.2-foot wooden mount-out
box is currently used. In preparation for deployment, it
will be a simple matter of closing the door and the PALCON
is ready to move. Mount-out stocks, repair parts, consum-
mable supplies, replacement items and various other operating
and training stocks can be assembled and binned in the PALCON.
With adjustable bins inside, a greater warehousing capability
will be possible, reducing container requirements. It was
determined through computer simulation that 1,000 tons of
cargo containerized in PALCON' s and handled in arrays con-
sisting of eight containers could be discharged from shipping
17in half the time required for palletized cargo.
The PALCON is expected to be completely compatible
with the following assets:
(1) USN amphibious ships
(2) merchant dry cargo shipping
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(3) all types of lighterage in the USN ' s inventory
(4) MHE in the USMC • s inventory
(5) motor transport equipment in the USMC's inventory
(6) cargo-carrying helicopters and aircraft in the USMC's
inventory (this includes the CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters
and the C-130 fixed-winged aircraft)
.
b. Intermediate-Size Container (QUADCON)
The intermediate-size container in the MCCS will
be a 5 X 8 X 6.5-foot container called a QUADCON. It is
designed for loads up to 10,0 00 lb. QUADCON * s will have
four-way forklift handling capability and hardware for con-
necting into arrays of four (thus the name QUADCON) to form a
standard 20-foot container. Therefore, the QUADCON can meet
IOS standards making it compatible with commercial container-
carrying shipping. Access will be through doors at each end
and the container will have the capability to carry the same
bin inserts as the PALCON. The QUADCON also has the optional
bin rack insert.
Combat service support units such as the supply
and maintenance units of the landing force will be the pri-
mary utilizer of the QUADCON. The container will be employed
to unitize bulk supplies and items too large for a PALCON.
USMC helicopters are capable of lifting the 10,000-pound
(gross weight) QUADCON. As determined previously, this is a
big advantage in ship offloading. Once ashore in the AOA,
QUADCON' s would not go any further than the LSA. They are
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too big and lack the mobility to be part of the ground
19
combat unit's T/E.
The compatibility of the QUADCON with various
types of shipping equipment and aircraft can be summarized
as follows
:
(1) Amphibious Ships . The QUADCON has limited
compatibility primarily due to the lack of MHE for internal
movement of 10,000-pound loads. Its size makes it not suit-
able for stowage in general cargo spaces due to the overhead
constraints. Vehicle spaces, however, provide ample room
for QUADCON storage.
(2) Merchant Ships . There exists a high degree
of compatibility with containerships and barge carriers since
the QUADCON does meet IOS standards; however, it has limited
compatibility with breakbulk ships and Roll on/Roll off (Ro/Ro)
ships. This is due to the fact that the latter are not de-
signed as container-carrying ships.
(3) Lighters . QUADCON ' s are completely compati-
ble with all lighters in the USN ' s inventory.
(4) MHE . A QUADCON can be liefted by the follow-
ing in USMC's inventory:
(a) light amphibious container handler
(LACH)
(b) the 10,000-pound, 48-inch load center,
rought-terrain forlift




(d) the 15-ton truck-mounted crane
(e) the 12 ^ -ton crawler-mounted crane.
It cannot be lifted, however, by the 40 00-pound, 24-inch
load center, rough-terrain forklift nor by the 7-=- -ton
wheel -mounted crane.
(5) Motor Transport . The QUADCON can be hauled
by the following trucks in the USMC ' s inventory:
(a) the semi-trailer, 6-ton M118A1
(b) the semi-trailer, 12-ton M127A2C with
M52A2 tractor
M123 tractor
(c) the semi-trailer, 25-ton M172A1 with
(d) the truck, cargo 5-ton M54A2C
The QUADCON is not compatible with the semi-trailer 6 5-ton
tank transporter nor the truck, cargo 2y-ton M35A2C.
(6) Aircraft. The QUADCON can be transported
by the CH-53 helicopter and the KC130 fixed-winged aircraft.
c. Bin Insert
The bin insert is compatible with both the PALCON
and the QUADCON containers . It is a covered box approxi-
mately 45 X 17 X 10 inches with adjustable dividers. The
box, in addition to being used as a container insert, is also
a replacement for the present wooden mount-out box. It has
*
a tare weight of 35 lb. and a cargo capacity of 120 lb.
Six inserts can be installed into the PALCON container and
20




36 into the QUADCO N. The insert is constructed of a foam
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molded plastic with a handler at each end.
d. Large Container
The large 8 X 8 X 20-foot container is similar
to the container used in the commercial transportation environ-
ment. The container has an exterior volume of 1,280 cubic
feet (cu. ft.) and an interior volume of 1,110 cu. ft. It
has a tare weight of 3,600 lb. and a cargo weight of 41,200
23lb. It is weatherproof and is used for transporting and
storing unit loads, packages and bulk material.
This large commercial container provides large
capacity while protecting the contents from loss or damage.
Metal, plywood or a combination of both can be used to con-
struct the large container. Construction, dimensions, fittings
and features conform to ANSI/IOS standards.
The 8 X 8 X 20-foot container will be employed
during the AFOE of a Marine amphibious force (MAF)-size opera-
tion. Due to its large size and weight, the container could
not be employed any further in than the LSA. When emptied, the
commercial-size container can be stuffed with retrograde
material for shipment out of the AOA. The compatibility of
the large commercial 8 X 8 X 20-foot container with various
types of shipping, equipment and aircraft can be summarized
as follows:
(1) Amphibious Ships . USN cargo ships are con-
figured primarily for bulk cargo. Large commercial containers
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are essentially incompatible with the general cargo spaces.
Also, there is no capability for internal handling of the
8 X 8 X 20-foot containers.
(2) Commercial Ships . Large containers have
excellent compatibility with containerships and barge car-
riers. This statement assumes a solution to the container
discharge problem in the AOA.
(3) Lighter . Large commercial 8 X 8 X 20-foot
containers are compatible with all lighters in the Navy's
inventory
.
(4) MHE . The LACH is the only MHE currently
in or projected into the USMC ' s inventory that can handle
the large commercial container.
(5) Motor Transport . There is little capability
in the USMC's inventory for land transportation of large
containers. The semi-trailer, 12-ton M127A2C with M52A2
tractor is the only capable vehicle, but it would require
modification to accommodate the weight of the container.
(6) Aircraft . The large container is not com-
24patible with any aircraft in the USMC ' s inventory.
e. Flatrack
A flatrack is an open-sided, open-ended and
open-topped platform carrier with 8-foot vertical-end
columns. There are 20-foot and 40-foot flatracks and both
conform to ANSI/IOS standards. The flatrack is needed to
pack and ship material which due to its irregular shape cannot
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be packed in enclosed containers. The reverse-osmosis,
water-purification unit, needed by the USMC landing force
ashore, is an example of a piece of equipment that would be
transported in a flatrack. The compatibility of the flatrack
with various types of shipping and equipment can be summarized
as follows:
(1) Amphibious Ships . Because of its large
size, it is incompatible with the general cargo spaces of
USN amphibious ships. The lack of internal handling equip-
ment would also pose a major problem.
(2) Commercial Ships . Because of its conformity
to ANSI/IOS standards, the flatrack has excellent compatibility
with containerships and barge carriers. As with the 8 X 8 X 20-
foot commercial container, this assumes a solution to the con-
tainer discharge problem from non-self-sustaining container-
ships in the AOA.
(3) Lighters . Flatracks are compatible with
all lighters in the USN's inventory.
(4) MHE . A great deal depends upon the size,
weight and shape of the equipment contained in the flatrack.
It is expected that the LACH has the capability to handle
the 8 X 8 X 20-foot flatrack on the beach. A great deal
of testing with different types of cargo needs to be accom-
plished in this area.
(5) Motor Transport . As with MHE, a great deal
depends upon the size, weight and shape of the cargo. The
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semi-trailer, 12-ton M127A2C with M52A2 tractor is the only
motor transport item in the USMC ' s inventory that can be
relied upon to carry the flatrack.
(6) Aircraft . Due to the flatrack' s large size
25
and weight, it is not compatible with any USMC aircraft.
f. Current Status and Cost Forecast
Exploratory development efforts have produced
preliminary designs and structural analyses for the PALCON
and the QUADCON containers, bin inserts and supporting racks.
In the first quarter of fiscal year (FY) 19 80, the Marine
Corps Development and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia,
reported initial QUADCON units were scheduled for completion
in mid-June with developmental testing slated during the
2 6
third quarter FY80. Feasibility of various types of
materials have been explored and models have been constructed
by Rohr Industries of Chula Vista, California. The develop-
ment of these containers does not present any distinct obsta-
27
cles regarding technical approach and risk.
Eight PALCON demonstration models were tested
by the First Marine Division Support Group on June 7, 1978,
at Camp Pendleton, California. Testing was conducted on the
beach and included loading and stacking the PALCON onto USMC
flatbed trailers. The testing was considered successful.
PALCON models were arrayed, loaded onto a trailer and unloaded
with various types of MHE in the USMC * s inventory. Some
problems were experienced with minor hardware items. It was
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also recommended that further testing should be conducted
28
under more adverse weather conditions.
The forecasted cost of the containers which make
up the MCCS is included in table V-2.
g. Acquisition Plan
Full-scale development and operational testing
for the intermediate-size containers will commence in FY81
with the delivery of pre-production prototypes. Current
plans call for enough inserts, PALCON ' s and QUADCON ' s to out-
fit a Marine amphibious unit (MAU) for operational testing




Based upon the results and analyses of all devel-
opmental and operational testing, a procurement data package
will be published. A procurement decision is currently
scheduled for the end of FY81. Production contracts will
be awarded for the number of containers that can be funded.
At the same time, efforts will be undertaken to acquire com-
mercially available containers needed to satisfy requirements
In order to reduce costs and keep the successful contractor
in production, multi-year procurement is planned.
h. Other Considerations in a Container-Oriented
Logistics System
The ship-to-shore movement and beach unloading
of containers have been addressed and analyzed in this
study. Two other considerations that are necessary for a
complete container-oriented logistics system in the AOA are
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worthy of mention. First is the motor transport available
to move a fully loaded 22.5-ton container once ashore; and
second is a soil stabilization system capable of supporting
container loads in sandy areas.
(1) Motor Transport . Assuming no modification
to current motor transport assets, the FMF does not have the
capability to transport an 8 X 8 X 20-foot commercial con-
tainer inland from the AOA. To solve this problem, a request
for a proposal for a heavy prime mover and a 22.5-ton logis-
tics trailer has been released to industry by the USMC in
the second quarter of FY80 . Present plans call for the
procurement of prototypes and commencement of a concept
31
validation test by 1 January 19 81.
(2) Soil Stabilization . Soil stabilization
materials to support a payload of 22.5 tons across a sandy
beach is required. Motor transport matting (MO-MAT) , a
reusable fiberglass matting currently in the USMC ' s inventory,
is suitable for use in situations in which a small area is
to be estabilized for a short period of time. This material
is not appropriate where relatively large areas, such as an
. . . 32LSA, may require a stabilizing agent.
The system showing the most promise for an
unimproved shoreline is the collapsible grid-soil-densifica-
tion system. The grid can best be described by its similarity
to egg carton separators. It is composed of a 4 X 4-foot
lattice section made of 6-inch wide aluminum slats. The
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lattice section folds almost flat into a manageable unit six
inches wide and eight ft. long. These units weigh less than
30 lb. and can be carried in sheaves across the tines of a
4000-pound rough-terrain forklift. The grid system can be
installed at the rate of 2000 square feet (sq. ft.) per hour.
In an amphibious operation, a rate of 600 sq. ft. is con-
sidered satisfactory. Due to its transportability, efficiency
and rapid rate of installation, the grid-soil-densification
system has promise for solving the surface stabilization
33problem in the AOA.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The USMC has under development a very innovative container
system designated MCCS . Some of the elements of this system
are compatible with USN amphibious ships for use in the AE
and all the elements are compatible with container-carrying
merchant ships for use in the AFOE
.
The PALCON, an element of MCCS, has compatibility with
any USN amphibious ship and the 20-foot cells of container-
ships. It will replace a spectrum of pallets and special
purpose containers which are behind the state-of-the-art in
dry cargo transportation. The PALCON will permit fast handling
in the AOA, helping to alleviate a long standing, beach-
bottleneck problem. It is durable and can be carried by
helicopter. It will eliminate the periodic need to replace
wooden mount-out boxes and pallets because of damage after
one or two deployments. The PALCON is small enough for use
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in transporting organizational equipment of combat forces
in the AE
.
The QUADCON is the largest container that still can be
lifted by the majority of MHE (to include helicopters) in
the AOA. The QUADCON gives the landing force the capability
to transport larger items such as tires, stretchers and tool
chests in an amphibious environment. It is designed for use
by the combat service support forces and will not be trans-
ported any further inland than the LSA.
The large 8 X 8 X 20-foot commercial container provides
the landing force with a large cargo capacity. It meets
ANSI/IOS size and weight specifications. It is compatible
with commercial container-carrying ships. Due to its size
and weight, it is not presently usable in an amphibious
environment. Container-handling, motor-transport and beach-
mobility problems have to be solved before it can be used in
the AOA.
The flatrack provides the capability to transport large
irregularly shaped items to the AOA. It meets ANSI/IOS
specifications and is compatible with commercial container-
carrying ships. As with the 8 X 8 X 20-foot container,
the same problems relative to handling equipment and motor
transport in the AOA currently exist.
Table V-3 summarizes the compatibility of each container




Currently, the containers discussed are still in the
developmental stage. It is projected that they will be in
the USMC's inventory by FY84. The use of the large commer-
cial containers will be contingent upon the solution of the
container-handling, motor-transport and beach-mobility
problems discussed in this study.
Generally, it can be concluded that the MCCS is a necessary
system that is compatible with container-oriented technology;
however, it has been ten years since the Defense Logistics
Review Board recommended a container-oriented logistics
system. The USMC system is still severely lacking. Containers
are not available, therefore, their use in an amphibious opera-
tion today is not possible. Even if they were available,
there would still be other problems that would prohibit the
use of 8 X 8 X 20-foot containers and flatracks. It appears,
as of this date, that it will be another three or four years
before containers are introduced into the USMC's inventory.
The conclusion made by a December 19 77 GAO study that, "the
container-oriented logistics system is severely lacking in




Supply Classes of Containerizable Material
Class % Containerizable
I Subsistence 100
II Clothing, Individual Equipment, Tentage, 100
Organizational Tool Sets & Kits, Hand
Tools, Administrative & Housekeeping
Supplies & Equipment
III POL - Petroleum Fuels, Lubricants, 100
Hydraulic & Insulating Oils, Liquid &
Compressed Gases, Bulk Chemical Products,
Coolants, De-icing & Antifreeze Compounds,
Preservatives, Additives & Coal
IV Construction - Construction Material, 80
Installed Equipment, Fortification/
Barrier Material
V Ammunition - Chemical, Biological, 100
Radiological & Special Weapons, Bombs,
Explosives, Mines, Fuzes, Detonators,
Pyrotechnics, Missiles, Rockets, &
Propellants
VI Nonmilitary Sales Items (Personal Demand) 100
VTI Major End Items
VIII Medical Material 100
IX Repair Parts 80
X Nonmilitary Programs 75













8 X 8 X 20-foot Commercial $4,300*
20-foot Flatrack $4,800
40-foot Flatrack $5,800
*Current DOD regulations prohibit service ownership.
Leasing costs are estimated at $5 per day per container










































8 X 8 X 20-foot Container
Flatrack
3 — Compatible with all
2 — Compatible with most




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The world events of 19 79 and 19 80 indicate that for the
United States (U.S.) there are many potential arenas for the
conduct of amphibious operations. Military airlift does not
have the required capacity to lift all the elements of a
Marine amphibious force (MAF) ; therefore, sealift is still
the primary mode of transportation for such a large force.
The number of United States Navy (USN) amphibious ships
has declined dramatically in the last 15 years and is at an
unsatisfactory level today. The procurement projection over
the next 20 years indicates a continued deterioration in the
number of amphibious ships. Therefore, future amphibious
operations involving a large United States Marine Corps
(USMC) force will be dependent upon the U.S. merchant fleet.
This study has analyzed the capability of the U.S. mer-
chant fleet to supplement the USN ' s reduced amphibious lift
capability. Since the current trend in the U.S. merchant
fleet is toward containerization, this study has also analyzed
the use of containerization as a radical change from the con-
ventional breakbulk cargo in an amphibious objective area
(AOA) .
This final chapter will present the general conclusions
of the author derived from this analysis. Also, included
will be several recommendations that, in the author's opinion,
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are necessary for the effective use of merchant ships and
containerization in amphibious operations of the future.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. History has proven that the U.S. Merchant Marine has
been inadequately prepared to support military needs at the
start of each war .
A development of the U.S. Merchant Marine with regard to
defense needs was presented. The importance of the merchant
marine in support of a military action was established. It
was determined that the merchant marine was not adequately
prepared to meet military transportation requirements. As
a result there has been a requirement for a rapid buildup of




Maritime support programs established by the U.S.
government have not been completely successful .
Due to the problems experienced with the preparedness of
the U.S. Merchant Marine at the start of each war, many
maritime support programs have been established. One pur-
pose of these programs has been to improve the U.S. Merchant
Marine's capability to respond in time of national crisis.
An examination of today's U.S. merchant fleet reveals that
the maritime support programs have not been completely
successful.
3. There are many problems with traditional sources of
merchant shipping in time of military crisis.
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a. The primary mission of the Military Sealift
Command (MSC) is to provide contingency sealift capability
for the Department of Defense (DOD) . The MSC is largely
dependent on the U.S. Merchant Marine for movement of mili-
tary sealift cargo. Currently, the MSC-controlled fleet con-
sists mainly of aging breakbulk ships and is deficient in
the newer intermodal ships. This deficiency affects MSC's
ability to satisfy critical sealift responsibilities.
b. The National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) is a
mothball fleet that has been established to provide reserve
shipping in time of crisis. Ships in the NDRF are suppose
to be capable of being activated within 30 days of callup.
Due to the old age and deteriorated condition of these ships,
NDRF cannot provide adequate reserve shipping within pre-
scribed time frames.
c. Within the NDRF is a smaller fleet known as the
Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) . These ships are supposed to be
maintained in a state of readiness that would allow them to
be put into operation within five to ten days. Testing has
shown that ships of the RRF cannot provide reserve shipping
within prescribed time frames.
d. The Effective United States Control Fleet (EUSC)
consists of ships under foreign registry that the U.S.
government can contract for defense needs in time of war.
Only 25 percent of the ships in this fleet are suitable for
dry cargo and the majority of them are not suitable for
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containers. It would be a mistake to count on EUSC for
quick availability of ships in time of war.
e. The possibility exists for an influx of foreign
ownership in the U.S. merchant shipping and shipbuilding
industry. The reliability of foreign owners in the U.S.
maritime industry to adequately respond in time of U.S.
crisis is unprecedented and questionable.
4
.
The use of privately-owned U.S. merchant ships in
support of combat operations has several limitations .
In terms of availability, there is a lack of a sufficient
number of merchant ships to keep a steady flow of imported
raw materials in the U.S. and, at the same time, support
combat operations . The raw materials are essential for the
production of war goods. Therefore, government decision-
makers will be faced with tough decisions on the use of the
limited number of U.S. merchant ships available.
In addition, there are other problems. U.S. merchant
shipbuilding is on the decline. Modern commercial ships that
are being built are specialized. They are configured for
containers and are dependent upon equipment-intensive, deep
water, pier facilities. Use of these specialized ships for
logistical support poses many problems for the U.S. military.
5. The design of merchant ships make them unsuitable for
use in the assault echelon (AE) of an amphibious operation .
The merchant ship is designed to make point-to-point trips
for the delivery of cargo as economically as possible. The
USN amphibious ship is designed to deliver a USMC landing
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force and its equipment to the AOA as expeditiously as
possible. The difference in objectives leads to differences
in manning, design and on-board equipment. Due to these
differences, the merchant ships examined in this study were
found to be unsuitable for use in the AE of an amphibious
operation. With extensive modification, the 20-knot, general
purpose cargo ship and cargo/passenger ship could be rendered
suitable for employment in the AE; however, these modifica-
tions are prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. Even
with extensive modification, the lighter aboard ship (LASH)
,
the Seabee, the Roll on/Roll off (Ro/Ro) ship and the Tri-




All the ships analyzed in this study were found to
be suitable for use in the assault follow-on echelon (AFOE)
of an amphibious operation .
With limited personnel and equipment augmentation, all
the ships analyzed are suitable for employment in the AFOE.
Table III- 3 shows the various advantages and disadvantages
of ships when employed in the AFOE. It can concluded from
the table that the ships have varying levels of usefulness.
One of the major problems that surfaced is the difficulty
of unloading ships in the open ocean. This problem is par-
ticularly acute with the Ro/Ro, Seabee and containership.
7. If the USN/USMC had to conduct an amphibious
operation requiring the use of non-self-sustaining contain-




There are many innovative concepts that offer solutions
to the various stages of the cargo discharge problem without
the use of a pier facility. Some of these concepts have
been completely developed and others are nearing completion;
however, none of them have been fully implemented as of this
date. Tables IV-10, IV-11 and IV-12 set forth the advantages
and disadvantages of these concepts. It will take a comple-
ment of most of the concepts listed in these three tables to
unload a MAF-size force in an amphibious environment.
Private industry has submitted very promising but expen-
sive concepts for solving the cargo discharge problem. These
concepts have not been acted upon due to the high cost of
development and purchase.
8. The USMC has under development the Marine Corps
Container System (MCCS) designed to be compatible with
amphibious and commercial shipping assets .
Conmencing in 19 69, DOD initiated a container-oriented
logistics system for all the military services. This action
resulted from the economic benefits of containerization and
the trend toward containerships . The USMC currently has
under development MCCS. This system is designed to be com-
patible with both amphibious and commercial shipping assets.
Eventually, the system will also be compatible with USMC
material handling equipment (MHE) , motor and air transporta-
tion and all USN lighters.
From this analysis the following conclusions can be made
concerning the major elements of the MCCS:
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a. the pallet-size container, PALCON, is compatible
with both USN amphibious ships and commercial container-
carrying ships. It also is compatible with USMC MHE, motor;
and air transportation and USN lighters.
b. The intermediate-size container, QUADCON, is
compatible with commercial container-carrying ships and all
USN lighters. The QUADCON is compatible with most USMC
MHE, motor and air transportation. Due to the lack of inter-
nal handling capability, it is currently not compatible with
USN amphibious shipping.
c. The large 8 X 8 X 20-foot commercial container
has the advantage of providing the landing force with large
cargo capacity. Because of its size and weight, it is
restricted from use in the AE. It is compatible with com-
mercial container-carrying ships and can be lifted by the
light amphibious container handler (LACH) . It can be carried
by all USN lighters. With modification, the 12-ton M127A2C
trailer with M52A2 tractor is the only vehicle in the USMC
inventory capable of carrying a commercial-size container.
On the negative side, the 8 X 8 X 20-foot container is not
compatible with USN amphibious shipping. This is due to
the lack of internal handling capability and overhead con-
straints in cargo stowage compartments. The large size and
weight of the 8 X 8 X 20-foot container prohibits its move-
ment by USMC air transportation assets.
d. The 20-foot and 40-foot flatracks have the advan-
tage of providing the landing force with the capability of
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transporting large, irregularly-shaped items. Bridging,
electronic-shelter components and water-purification systems
are examples of items that would be transported in flatracks.
Due to the large size and heavy weight of the flatrack and
its contents, the same problems of transportability that
apply to the 8 X 8 X 20-foot container apply to the flatrack.
9 . There are other problems that exist before a
container-oriented logistics system is possible in the AOA .
The USMC is approaching a container-oriented logistics
system compatible with modern merchant ships. This system,
once completely developed, will improve cargo throughput in
a MAF-size amphibious operation. However, the following
problems are still existent before such a system is possible.
a. Due to the lack of a soil stabilization system,
there would be difficulty in transporting the large 8 X 8 X 20-
foot container and flatrack on the beach and also further
inland if improved roads are not available.
b. Assuming no modification, there is no motor
transport equipment in the USMC's inventory capable of
carrying the 8 X 8 X 20-foot container.
c. With the exception of the LACH, there are no
other items of MHE in the USMC's inventory that can adequately
handle the 8 X 8 X 20-foot container and flatrack.
d. There are no helicopter assets in the USMC's




In summary, there are a multitude of problems that face
the USN/USMC when considering the use of merchant ships and
containerization in an amphibious operation. The following
section is a list of recommendations that military planners
need to consider if solutions to the problems highlighted in
this study are to be found.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
In order to have the required logistical support neces-
sary for the conduct of an efficient MAF-size amphibious
operation, the following recommendations are made.
1. Military planners have to establish what they need
in the form of merchant shipping assets .
Specific military contingencies, such as MAE-size
amphibious operation, have to be examined. The number and
type of merchant ships required to support a contingency
have to be determined.
2. POD working with other governmental agencies have
to take the necessary steps to ensure the availability of
merchant ships in time of need .
DOD working with the Departments of Transportation and
Commerce should ensure a merchant marine capable of serving
as a naval auxiliary in time of war or national emergency.
At a minimum, this will require lobbying for new legislation
to improve the maritime support programs now in effect for
U.S. shipowners and shipbuilders.
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3. MSC must be heavily involved in determining contin-
gency needs for surface container movement in amphibious
operations .
The USMC trend toward a container-oriented logistics
system must be supported by the appropriate type of shipping.
MSC must ensure that its fleet has a sufficient number of
ships that are technically capable of carrying the con-
tainerized cargo of a MAF.
4. The USN together with the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) must place more emphasis on the readiness of the RRF .
Inadequate shipping and response time of the NDRF elim-
inates consideration of these ships for use in an amphibious
operation. Therefore, the USN together with MARAD must place
more emphasis on the readiness of the RRF. The ability of
these ships to be operational within five to ten days must be
thoroughly tested. The suitability of these ships to be used
in an amphibious operation should be analyzed and every
attempt to correct deficiencies should be made.
5
.
The USN must take the necessary steps to ensure there
is sufficient supplementary equipment available for merchant
ships .
In order to make merchant ships suitable for use in the
AFOE of an amphibious operation, supplementary equipment is
needed. This includes provisions for:
a. communication/electronic (COMM/ELECT) equipment
b. damage and fire-control equipment
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c. a helicopter- landing zone
d. close in weapons system (CIWS)
e. facilities for additional crew and members of the
landing force.
The specific types and amounts of equipment needed for each
type of merchant ship has to be analyzed and a source has to
be provided for use in a contingency.
6. The USN must ensure a source of additional crews for
merchant ships .
The additional facilities and equipment needed for the
use of a merchant ship in the AFOE require additional per-
sonnel. The USN must analyze the personnel requirements for
each type of merchant ship and a source for obtaining trained
personnel on a short notice must be included in contingency
planning.
7. The USN must complete the development of the container
and vehicle discharge systems as rapidly as possible .
The innovative systems designed for the offloading of
merchant ships in an amphibious environment must be expedi-
tiously developed. Once development is completed, an all
out effort should be made to procure satisfactory amounts
of this equipment for the USN ' s inventory.
8. The offshore container-discharge concepts proposed
by industry should be given the utmost consideration .
The concepts proposed by industry should be analyzed and
tested. Based on results, the USN should incorporate the
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procurement of the most efficient and cost-effective equip-
ment into strategic planning.
9 . The USMC should expedite the development and procure-
ment of equipment necessary for a complete container-oriented
logistics system .
This includes not only the containers currently under
development, but also MHE, motor transport and soil stabili-
zation systems.
10. POD should reconstitute development of the HLH once
being developed by the USA .
A helicopter is needed to lift a fully loaded 8 X 8 X 20-
foot commercial container. The HLH, once under development
by the USA but discontinued due to financial constraints,
can provide this required lift capability.
The above recommendations are necessary to ensure the
following:
1. the USN/USMC team can count on the U.S. Merchant
Marine as a naval auxiliary in an amphibious operation,
2. the merchant ships provided will be the best equipped,
safest and most suitable vessels that modern technology
allows,
3. the USMC will have cargo containers available for
possible amphibious operations of the future, thereby having




4. the USN and USMC will have the equipment available
in the AOA to unload cargo from ships, move it through the
surf zone, unload it at the beach and transport it inland.
D. SUMMARY
Chapters II through V of this study have analyzed the
capability of the USN/USMC to use merchant ships and con-
tainerization in an amphibious operation. Due to the trend
of modern transportation systems toward container izat ion,
the USN/USMC must have a container-oriented logistics system
for use in the AOA. This means that shippping, container-
handling equipment and motor transport assets have to be com-
patible. This study has shown that this is currently not the
case. The low priority ranking that has reduced the USN
fleet has slowed the development of a complete container-
oriented logistics system for use in an amphibious environment
A decade has passed since DOD has set forth the require-
ment to implement a container-oriented logistics system.
Based on the current procurement projections cited in this
study, it will be no earlier than 1984 before the USMC has
the necessary containers in its inventory. Procurement
projections for much of the container-handling equipment,
motor transport and soil stabilization systems necessary for
a complete system are currently not available.
In summary, it is the author's opinion that the USN/USMC
team composes the greatest amphibious fighting force in the
world today. However, its capability to conduct large scale
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